Chapter 1

W(h)ither the Russian State?

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The twentieth century was bracketed by two seminal events: the formation of the Soviet Union through the revolution of 1917, and the collapse of the Soviet system in 1991. Far from being the end of history that Marx would have predicted, the withering and then demise of the Soviet state brought with it the rebirth of Russia. In the early 1990s many hoped that the renewed Russian state would succeed where its Soviet predecessor had ultimately failed - in the provision of public goods and services to an exhausted population.

After a decade of incomplete reform, however, few Russians have yet attained the benefits of their nation’s most recent great transformation. Indeed, the central state’s inability to extract revenues, enforce contracts, pay public sector wages on time, provide meaningful poverty relief or even basic social services have defined the post-
Soviet transition effort. This book, therefore, identifies the Russian state’s inability to extend its authority across the vast Eurasian landmass as the primary problem of post-communist governance.

Governing Russia, of course, has always been a challenge. Anyone who has traveled by air or rail from Moscow to Vladivostok cannot but be awe-struck by the sheer expanse of the country. The Russian Federation, the largest country on the planet, spans 11 time zones, comprises 89 provinces, and contains within its borders over 128 distinct indigenous ethnic groups.

Nonetheless, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the protracted economic crisis that ensued offer a crucial new opportunity to redefine relationships within the state itself and between the state and emergent sectors of society. Undeniably such a redefinition has occurred. But despite the rhetorical triumph of democracy and markets, positive developmental outcomes have been far fewer and come more slowly than expected in the heady days that followed the lowering of the Sickle and Hammer and the raising of the Russian tricolor flag over the Kremlin on December 25, 1991.

Despite the political rights and freedoms that Mikhail Gorbachev extended in the late 1980’s, and which Boris
Yeltsin consolidated in the early 1990’s, Russian citizens remain, in the words of their second elected president, Vladimir Putin, “poor people living in a rich country.”¹ At the end of 1998, the OECD reported that Russia’s gross domestic product per capita was US$1,862. In contrast, GDP per capita was $5,050 in the Czech Republic, $4,461.00 in Hungary, $3,509 in Poland, $2,979 in Turkey, $25,470 in Germany and $29,326 in the United States.² In 1987 the gross national product of the Soviet Union (of which Russia’s was a large proportion) was 30 percent of US GNP. In 1999, the first year following the Soviet collapse that registered positive economic growth, Russia’s GNP was still roughly only 5 percent of the United States’ GNP.³ After three years of growth, Russia has only just regained its dismal economic footing from the early 1990’s.⁴

Russia’s bumpy economic transition has exacted a clear social toll. The country experienced negative population growth of 0.5 percent in the decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union.⁵ In 2002, the Russian State Committee on Statistics reported that 33 percent of the population lived below the official subsistence minimum level of $55 per capita per month.⁶ The death rate exceeded the birth rate by almost two to one.⁷ Infant mortality dropped such that there were 16 deaths for every 1000 live births – more
than double that of other transitional economies like the Czech Republic and Hungary, for example. Male life expectancy was 59.6 years and almost 73 years for women, down from almost 65 years for men and almost 75 years for women in 1987.

Russia’s rocky reform experience is far from unique in many respects, although perhaps distinctive in others. Post-Soviet Russia is a striking example of a weak state syndrome in the developing world and now a good part of the formerly communist region. Despite even the best of intentions, new states frequently turn out to be incapable of positively changing the lives of the people they are supposed to govern. Indeed, new ineffective states often make life worse for all but a select few. Why does this happen? How do fledgling democracies ensure adequate governance, and why do they so often fail to do so? What are the consequences of this weak state syndrome for developing countries? Finally, what contributions might the post-Soviet Russian case make to our understanding of state development and the problem of governance in developing states?

This study demonstrates that, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the introduction of sweeping reform,
the new Russian state, rather than leading a social and economic transformation was itself transformed by latent socio-economic forces. In particular, I argue that the post-Soviet Russian state has been able to do little to improve the lives of average people in no small part because of its basic inability to convey its authority, and ensure the implementation of its policies, in the Russian provinces. Policymaking authority devolved quickly and completely from center to periphery throughout the 1990’s. In less than a decade, Russia went from a country tightly governed by the institutional constraints of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the planned economy to what might be termed a “hyper-federation.” The center lost an effective governing presence in many Russian provinces. Even just prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, regional governments had begun to openly defy the central state and usurp central authority. This phenomenon accelerated throughout the 1990s as regional political actors declared their laws sovereign on provincial territory, usurped federal taxation privileges, imposed illegal internal tariffs, established citizenship requirements distinct from those of the Russian Federation, and even issued their own currencies. By the late 1990’s,
unbridled provincial ambition threatened the cohesion of Russia as a single political and economic expanse.

Some decentralization was both inevitable and desirable following the collapse of the Soviet system of central planning and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the Russian case indicates that rapid decentralization in the absence of a central state capable of regulating and coordinating, even minimally, the policies of subnational political units, can impede political development and economic growth. To some degree, therefore, the arguments and evidence presented here run counter to those who would maintain that the greatest threat to the growth of competitive markets in federal states is an unrestrained central state. In Russia, it is weakly restrained regional governments and an impotent central state that threaten the emergence of a truly market-based economy.¹¹

Russia also puts another nail in the coffin of the idea that state size correlates positively with state capacity. Regional flouting of central policy occurred despite the fact that federal agencies were already abundant in both center and periphery and the central state’s participation in social and economic life was still significant on paper. Russian state expenditures at all
levels of government comprised between 38 and 42 percent of official gross domestic product from 1995 to 1998. This translates into 56 to 61 percent of real legal gross domestic product. Indeed, the Russian state apparatus actually grew throughout the 1990’s relative to its size in the first few years following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Russian State Committee on Statistics reported in 1999 that despite central state efforts to cut the size of the Russian bureaucracy, it grew steadily in terms of the number of officials employed in federal agencies and regional administrations since 1994. Where in 1994, for example, there were a reported 1,004,000 officials employed at all layers of the state, that number had increased each year to reach 1,133,000 by the end of 1999. Not surprisingly, therefore, state spending on its apparatus also increased steadily since 1994 (the first year for which such figures are available) from 1.73 percent of all state spending in 1994 to 2.4 percent in 1998. More than two years after the ascent of Vladimir Putin in 2000 to the top of the Russian state hierarchy, a Russian bureaucrat was born every 18 minutes. Indeed, the number of bureaucrats has increased in the last ten years as Russia’s total population has declined, such that about 10 percent of the population in 2002 worked in the civil
service.\textsuperscript{16} At the same time, there were about 300,000 more Russians employed in the civil service than in the army.\textsuperscript{17}

But despite its size, the Russian central state did not govern authoritatively in the heartland. The central state had a dominating presence on paper in a wide variety of policy areas, but it often lacked power in practice.

Undeniably, there are certain advantages politically and economically to keeping the Russian central state weak and limited. The Soviet state, after all, was overly intrusive into people’s daily lives. A democratic Russian state should obviously allow far greater political and economic freedom. To encourage thriving markets and a lively democracy, the Russian state should be smaller and weaker than its Soviet predecessor. Further, experience from other transitional contexts demonstrates that strong states faced with weak societies, like Russia’s, can hinder the development of pluralist politics.\textsuperscript{18} But even a minimalist state need not be weak. On the contrary, even if limited, it must be strong enough to regulate certain key aspects of markets (to keep transaction costs low, ensure the free flow of goods, enforce contracts and protect property rights) and the preservation and protection of civil and political rights of its citizenry.\textsuperscript{19} But accomplishing these crucial tasks requires provincial
The intellectual and policy agendas of books on state capacity and state power open up a Pandora’s box of thorny theoretical questions and practical challenges. Most authors can generally agree on a definition of the state, although there are more disagreements in the comparative literature regarding the difficult concept of state capacity, or state effectiveness. A third set of theoretical concerns is the role of the state in promoting economic development and democracy.

My own theoretical focus is in some ways prior to this last issue. This book is not so much about the state’s role in development (although certainly the focus is related to this issue) as much as it is concerned with the issue of governing capability across territory. If the state cannot project authority within its borders, then it is unlikely to be able to provide the basic framework required for the establishment of any coherent development project. My theoretical and empirical goals are more narrowly to determine the extent to which central state agencies and
actors were able to project authority across territory and to decipher what factors promoted or impeded the state’s capabilities in this regard.

I adopt Michael Mann’s definition of the state, which is drawn, in turn from Charles Tilly and Max Weber. For Mann the state is,

(i) a differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying (ii) centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from a center to cover a (iii) territorially demarcated area over with it exercises (iv) a monopoly of authoritative binding rule-making backed up by a monopoly of the means of physical violence.  

The attractive aspects of this definition for the current study are that it emphasizes both the institutional and territorial dimensions of the state. The Weberian reference to the state’s monopoly over legitimate means of violence is also crucial. But it is the credible threat of sanction for those who do not comply with state authority rather than the actual use of force that is at the core of modern state capacity. The importance of gaining compliance from key sectors of society is instrumental in a state’s ability to govern. As a result, the degree of compliance to state authority is a direct measure of a state’s relative power in relation to various segments of society. It is “a
fundamental conflict” over whom - the state or other organizations -- makes the rules that guide society.\textsuperscript{22}

There are almost as many ways of measuring state power or capacity or ability to govern, as there are definitions of these terms.\textsuperscript{23} In common, however, is the idea that relative compliance to clearly articulated state goals through the promulgation of policy and laws is the crux of the issue. As Robert Jackman argues, non-compliance to the will of the state, “is an escalation that reflects a failure of political institutions to channel demands, grievances and challenges. It is prima facie evidence that [state] institutions have lost legitimacy.”\textsuperscript{24}

The authority that a state has can only be understood as a relative concept in that it involves the state (which can itself be disaggregated) and at least one or more actors or groups. It also involves a conflict or dispute between the state and other organizations over interests or property or something of value to both. The extent of the state’s authority over other groups is manifested by the degree to which these groups comply with the state’s will. It is assumed that other groups and organizations comply with the state’s demands because of fear of a threatened negative sanction for non-compliance.\textsuperscript{25}
I view the state’s inability to extract compliance from lower levels of government as a symptom of a broader problem caused by a rift within Russian state and society relations more generally. That is, I argue that a key reason that the Russian central state cannot ensure reliable regional government compliance to its policies and laws is because regional government actors often have been effectively captured by or actively collude with key regional economic interests against the central state.

I distinguish between two types of central state authority. First, I examine the center’s ability to extract compliance from elected regional political authorities. I begin by viewing different parts of the state acting in relation to their provincial counterparts to assess the degree to which central power is projected outwards into the periphery. To what degree do provincial governments comply with central state law and the constitution? What are the patterns of non-compliance across time, policy area and territory?

Second, because states exercise power through institutions, I look inside the administrative mechanisms of state bureaucracy in examining the Russian state’s infrastructural capacity or: “the capacity of the state to actually penetrate society, and to implement logistically
political decisions throughout the realm."²⁶ Where despotic power is the "power of the state elite over civil society, infrastructural power is the ability of the state to penetrate and centrally coordinate the actions of civil society."²⁷ Consolidated capitalist democracies rely not on force to ensure the allegiance of their populations, but on bureaucratic and organizational capacity. Even states that are heavily reliant on force, but that lack significant infrastructural supports are by nature precarious.²⁸ A crucial contributor then to a state’s capacity, authority and stability is its infrastructural base – a bureaucracy that has some degree of autonomy from societal interests and that can also provide a reliable mechanism of organizational control and coherence.²⁹

Introducing distinctions between types of state power into the analysis allows us to more reliably assess the nature of the contemporary Russian state. It also helps to underscore the fact that if Russia intends to build a modern, democratic capitalist state (as its leaders have frequently declared as their goal over the past decade), then it must possess sufficient infrastructural power to ensure its authority extends beyond the Kremlin walls. For regardless of the amount of financial aid Russia receives from international organizations, the quality of its fiscal
or social policies, or even the fiscal and political threats issued by the president, if the state lacks sufficient infrastructural power, then positive changes will come slowly if at all to the lives of average Russians.

The remainder of the study seeks to explain the weaknesses of central political and administrative authority in the periphery. I argue that it is a result of both the constellation of political and economic forces that were created in the wake of the Soviet collapse, and the consolidation of these interests through Russia’s early economic reform choices and compromises (in particular, the privatization program of 1992-1994 that included large and medium sized enterprises).

The transfer from state ownership to a system of private ownership that was dominated by insider interests within the bulk of Russian enterprises consolidated strong, but particularistic societal interests. The new “entrepreneurchiki,” formerly members of the Soviet nomenklatura, were determined to prevent the new Russian state from regulating their rent seeking activities. These groups benefited from stalled reform and have an interest – even an investment – in preventing further change. They
preferred to co-opt regional governments (or colluded directly with them) to prevent the central state from effectively regulating their activities. This was to lock in their early transitional gains, or in some cases, to prevent further losses. This phenomenon has been documented in parts of Eastern Europe in explaining stalled economic reform, but it is also highly relevant in explaining stalled state building and low state capacity in dual transitional contexts like Russia.\footnote{30} In sum, this behavior has had not only a negative economic effect in transitional Russia, but a concomitantly damaging political effect on the development and capacities of the new Russian state.

In previous work on the political economy of the Russian provinces, I found that cooperation (or collusion) between newly elected regional governments and enterprise directors generated relatively effective provincial governance in an otherwise chaotic national political and economic environment. But I also warned that in the longer term, it might allow a narrow set of powerful interests to dominate provincial level government and thus prevent the growth of political pluralism at the regional level.\footnote{31} The current study confirms this concern. It also demonstrates that the collusion between powerful regional political and economic elites also has a clearly negative effect on what
the central state could accomplish in the periphery. In sum, these interests resisted the central state’s incursion into their activities primarily for narrow personal gain. In doing so, they threatened the veracity of Russia as a single political and economic unit as well as endangered its future political and economic development.

**The Russian Experience in Comparative Perspective:**

Not only is post-Soviet Russia fertile soil for the study of state capacity and development, such a project has much to offer comparative theories of political development more generally. Throughout the 1980’s and much of the 1990’s scholars focused on democratization and the construction of democratic institutions (eg. popular elections, the advantages and disadvantages of parliamentary over presidential systems, etc.). However, with the tentative triumph of electoral (if not always liberal) democracy in the late twentieth century, the time has come to refocus our attention on the more difficult question as to why some states have proven unable to govern effectively in new (if unconsolidated and tentative) democracies.

Questions about state efficacy are intimately linked with the larger issues of democratic consolidation and
resilience. If new democratic states prove incapable of better delivering goods and services to their beleaguered populations than their authoritarian predecessors, then the danger of regime reversal surely increases. Indeed in Russia, the economic and social disappointments of the reform period have at times thrown the question of Russia’s democratic endurance in jeopardy. In a 1999 poll, VtsIOM, a respected national public opinion polling center, reported that only five percent of respondents had a positive view of the reform era under President Yeltsin, while 72 percent had a negative view, with the remainder undecided. Further, the proportion of respondents agreeing with the statement that “It would have been better if the country had remained as it was before 1985” increased from 44 percent in 1994 to 58 percent in 1999.33

As many third-wave democratizing states remain unable to fulfill the developmental promises made at the start of their transitions, Russian and other post-communist development trajectories strongly recommend that the issue to which we should turn now (or return) is not just the kind of government in any particular state (democratic or authoritarian), therefore, but the degree of government and the state’s actual capacity to govern.34
Within comparative politics, there is an older literature and an increasingly richer contemporary literature concerned with just these problems. The Russian case corroborates some of the experiences of other country cases. It also offers several distinct contributions to the study of state capacity and comparative governance.

Samuel Huntington, in 1968 argued that the problem in the developing world was increasingly that societal demands out paced state institutional development rendering states incapable of governing effectively. In post-Soviet Russia, however, with a few exceptions, mass social mobilization was generally quite low. Indeed, Russian mass society became increasingly demobilized politically as the 1990’s wore on and the living situation of the average citizen worsened. The fact that social services (such as they were) were also still frequently provided at places of work gave less incentive to workers to strike or cause widespread social disruption. Further, as noted earlier in this chapter, the state is not lacking for an institutional presence. Thus, Russia presents something of a paradox for Huntington in that it is a case of low (mass) social mobilization, a high degree of state institutionalization (if we understand this to mean a high number of
institutions and bureaucrats), but still low central state capacity to provide public goods.

My evidence and arguments demonstrate that while Russia does not suffer from a lack of political institutions, it may lack the right kinds of institutions — those that are capable of capturing and restraining emergent social interests. This threatened the central state’s ability to govern the country effectively.

More recent literature on state capacity in developing countries argues that an effective state is more properly conceived of as not so much governing over society as much as it governs with societal cooperation — or that the state and society are mutually empowering. We must understand the capable “developmental” state as fundamentally embedded in society, although ideally not captured by societal elements.³⁶

This, however, is a difficult task to achieve as most of these authors themselves realize. The solution, for some, as for Huntington before them, is also more state institutionalization. Peter Evans argues, for example, that contra the neo-liberal paradigm of the state dominant in the 1980’s: “It is the scarcity of bureaucracy that undermines development, not its prevalence.”³⁷ But this does not hit exactly the right chord either, for the post-Soviet
Russian state, as noted above, does not lack for bureaucracy, yet it is still unable to effectively implement its programs at the regional level. Again then, the Russian experience points to the fact that it is certain kinds of institutions that contribute to the development of state capacity and it is certain kinds of capacities that are most important to develop in transitional economies and democracies. (I return to this discussion in greater detail in chapter 8.)

Finally, Russia’s post-Soviet state building trajectory provides an interesting contrast to the reigning paradigm of the West European experience (which appears increasingly distinct from the contemporary experiences of developing countries more generally). Such a comparison helps to highlight the challenges that Russia and some East European countries faced in building state capacity in the 1990’s.

Dominant theories of the rise of the modern state in Western Europe focus on the need for resources to fund successive territorial conquests. Charles Tilly, for example, argues that “war made states” in that a state’s administrative capacities were built up by the desire of ruling elites to finance their war-making activities.
Tilly argues that “in one way or another, conquest involved administration.”\(^4\)

For the most part, post-communist states face no such exigency as war to build their administrative capacities. Indeed, the conflicts of the Balkans and even Russia’s war in Chechnia appear to have done more to tear down rather than to build up state administrative capacities. But perhaps the most fundamental difference is that West European state building depended on privately held financial resources that ruling elites had to extract from society in order to build the state. In the post-communist world, however, these assets lay within the state itself. This fact alone created a very different dynamic regarding elite behavior and the nature and extent of state administrative development following the demise of the Soviet state in December 1991.

Where the project of elites involved in Western European state development was to effectively build up state institutions to extract assets from society in order to wage war and administer conquered territory, my findings argue that in contrast, the post-communist “project” has been to tear the state down through predation in order to enrich a narrow slice of Russian society, members of which were often former Soviet bureaucrats.\(^4\)
Plan of the Study:

This study of transitional Russia shows how and why the central state lost a good deal of control over its own policies to localized, particularistic interests in the provinces.

In chapter two I develop the argument that the nature of the Soviet collapse left post-Soviet reformers with a diverse and often conflicting constellation of interests to incorporate into the reform process. This led to early macro-economic reform decisions that strengthened opposition to any further reform policies that would imperil the early gains made by entrenched economic interests in the provinces. In particular, to protect the rents that they gained from communism’s demise, these groups cooperated with regional governments to resist the central state’s attempts to tax and to encourage competition in their regions. These goals often dominated regional government activities in Russia in the 1990s. This, then, was the basis of regional resistance to central authority and helped to undermine the infrastructural capacity of the Russian state.

Chapters three, four and five contain the empirical core of the study. Chapters three and four present two aspects of the dependent variable, central state capacity,
while chapter five examines the causal chain of the argument. Chapter three traces the patterns of regional government non-compliance to federal policy and the constitution from 1994 through 1999 and Boris Yeltsin’s resignation as president. The main patterns that emerge from statistical analysis of the data in this chapter indicate that regional government resistance to the central state had little to do with ethnic or cultural claims from non-Russian regions. Indeed, non-compliance to central policy had no statistical correlation whatsoever to the proportion of regional populations having non-Russian ethnicity. Instead, regions tended to defy central state oversight in economic policy areas in particular (taxation, licensing, trade barriers, the promotion of competition, and labor mobility for example). Further, it was the wealthiest and most industrialized regions that were home to economically powerful enterprises that proved the most defiant to central regulation.

Building on the findings in chapter three, and operationalizing the notion of central state infrastructural power, chapter four draws on a survey of public officials in 72 regions to delve more deeply into the workings of the Russian state. The survey explores how different policies were made and implemented in practice at
the provincial level. It examines what role federal authorities played in provincial policy making and implementation as opposed to other social forces.

This chapter makes a number of fundamental observations that support the patterns noted in chapter three. First, in virtually all regions of Russia regional forces prevail over federal forces in economic policy areas as opposed to social policy areas. This relationship was stronger for wealthier regions than for poorer ones and had no statistically significant correlation with non-Russian ethnicity. Second, heads of executive branches of government (regional governors and presidents of republics) reported that the support that they received in policy implementation from regional business groups was more important to them than the support that they received from federal ministries, federal law, or even (somewhat surprisingly) federal funds. In sum, this chapter establishes that the source of provincial resistance to central state authority appeared to be powerful regional economic interests.

Chapter five then provides the empirical underpinnings of the argument previewed in chapter two by examining in greater detail the relationships among various levels of public officials as well as the various ways in which non-
state actors entered into close partnership with regional government actors. This chapter also refutes contending arguments as to how the central state may have exercised its authority in the provinces in the past including a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of mechanisms of Russian fiscal federalism; purported strategies on the part of the federal government to deal with regions bilaterally in an effort to “divide and conquer” them politically; and President Putin’s strategy of building more federal bureaucracy in an effort to quell errant regional governments.

Instead, this chapter demonstrates that there was a positive correlation between non-compliance with federal law and the degree to which political actors reported heavy influence on their activities by regional business groups. This correlation increased with the wealth, level of industrialization and presence of economically powerful enterprises located in the region. Economic and not cultural variables, with few exceptions, largely account for the variations in relative non-compliance to the central state and central infrastructural authority among regions that I observed in chapters three and four.

In sum, the empirics in this section of the study indicate that these groups, often in cooperation with
regional officials, actively worked to block central state regulation of their activities. They preferred to stall Russia’s state building project, working to undermine the central state in order to advance their own narrow interests.

Chapter six extends the theory to the underdevelopment of national political parties outside the Russian State Duma. Using regional election results from the first three rounds of gubernatorial and legislative elections in the Russian provinces, I demonstrate the low degree of partisanship among regional politicians in Russia that has persisted from 1994 to the present.

I argue that this behavior was consistent with the interests of regional elites. That is, they preferred a “partial reform equilibrium” in political institutional development. This allowed them to avoid widening the sphere of accountability for their decisions in order to protect the gains they made in the early stage of the economic transition.

Consistent with the arguments and evidence in chapters 2 and 5, therefore, I argue that just as they resisted central state regulation of regional policy, these interests also opposed party development and the limitations on populistic and personalistic governance that
national political party institutions would bring. Limited party development, however, also meant even worse central state linkage to the periphery and contributed further to the compliance problem in the regions.

Chapter seven compares the Russian experience in governing the periphery to that of China and Poland in particular. In China, the fact that political institutions were left largely intact as economic reform began has done much to ensure the preservation of central authority in the periphery (relative to Russia). This has come, however, at the expense of democratic freedoms. In Poland, the state maintained its capacity while at the same time initiating a political and economic transition. Thus the two cases provide interesting contrasts to the Russian experience while furthering the goal of explaining why some states can maintain state administrative capacity across territory even as they implement far-reaching reform, while others cannot.

Finally, chapter eight concludes the study with a discussion of the consequences of eroding central state capacity for Russia’s future economic and political development trajectory. The theory and empirics of the study as a whole demonstrate how, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new Russian state initiated a series
of changes in 1992, which had the unintended consequence of undermining the state itself.

The overarching concern that this project underscores is the danger of an enduring vicious cycle of weak institutions and resulting low state capacity in many developing countries. This chapter presents policy suggestions for how this difficult and pervasive problem might be overcome. Finally, I discuss the comparative lessons Russia presents for state building and the development of an administratively capable state in post-communist contexts and other developing countries more generally.

1 Vladimir Putin inaugural speech May 2000, RFE/RL.
5 OECD Survey, Russian Federation, p. 178.
14 This data is taken from the federal law "O federalnom budgete RF", which is published annually in "Sobranie aktov gosudarstvennogo zakonodatelstva RF" for each year noted in the text. I am thankful to Dr. Emil Pain, former advisor to the Russian President for nationalities affairs, for providing me with this material.
17 Kovalyev.
18 Migdal, p.xx
19 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation:..., Guillermo O’Donnell, ...., and Kiren Chaudry, ...
22 Migdal, p. 31.
26 Mann in Hall eds., p. 113.
27 Mann in Hall eds., p. 114, emphasis added.
28 Mann in Hall eds., p. 134. Jackman at p. 116 also notes that a state’s use of force against society usually indicates its decreased capacity.
29 A similar point is made in Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
32 Witness the titles of a spate of books on democracy and democratic transition in the last ten years alone. For example: Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: Oklahoma University Press, 1991); Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien, Consolidating Third World Democracies: Regional Challenges (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Diamond and Plattner, The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. This is merely a representative, but by no means an exhaustive, list of course.
35 This is not to suggest, however, that there have not been labor strikes in transitional Russia. The coal industry is one area where strike action was sometimes quite frequent, however, even those labor actions gradually trailed off with the demands of the strikers going largely unsatisfied. See Stephen Crowley, Hot


38 See Herbst, 2000 for further confirmation of this point.


40 Tilly, 1994, p. 15.


43 In the regression analysis in chapters three and five, I define economically powerful as having greater than 35 percent of national market share of a particular product. This is a definition used by the Russian State Committee on Statistics in identifying economically important enterprises in Russia.

44 The one notable exception to this finding is the Chechen Republic. I discuss this in more detail in chapters three and five. Chechnya could not be included in the data in chapter four for logistical reasons. There was no real government to interview due to the conflict in progress at the time of the survey and we could not safely put interviewers on the ground in any event.


46 See for example, Hellman, 1998.