THE NEW SOVIET APPROACH TO SECURITY
Matthew Evangelista

Both the United States and the Soviet Union are doing research on the possibilities of applying new technologies to the cause of defense. If these technologies become a reality, it is my dream that — well, to one day free us all from the threat of nuclear destruction.

Ronald Reagan, New Year's Message to the Soviet People, January 1, 1986

It is a reality of today's world that it is senseless to seek greater security for oneself through new types of weapons. At present, every step in the arms race increases the danger and the risk for both sides, and for all humankind.

Mikhail Gorbachev, New Year's Message to the American People, January 1, 1986

The Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev has offered the prospect of a disarmament agreement more comprehensive than any that has been proposed in two decades of superpower negotiations. Whereas the SALT process of the 1970s mainly codified an ongoing qualitative arms race, the recent Soviet proposals entail genuine disarmament: 50 percent cuts in strategic arsenals; removal of Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe; conventional force reductions; a comprehensive and verified nuclear test ban; provisions for on-site inspection; and the hint of other welcome developments, such as withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Gorbachev has characterized this pursuit of disarmament as "the central direction of [Soviet] foreign policy for the coming years."

Indeed, a major agreement could serve Soviet interests. By lowering the level of nuclear and conventional forces, reducing tensions and

Matthew Evangelista teaches Soviet and world politics in the department of political science at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. He would like to express appreciation to the University's Office of International Peace and Security Research for support during the writing of this article and to Frank von Hippel and John D. Tower for their helpful comments.
decreasing the likelihood of war, it could have a positive effect on Soviet and international security. If it allowed for reductions in Soviet military expenditures, it could contribute significantly to Gorbachev's economic goals, particularly the ambitious growth rates targeted for the next few years. Gorbachev himself could benefit from a significant arms control accord, since it would bolster his position within the Soviet leadership. Further, the new Soviet leadership seems to view arms control as a means of improving the international atmosphere—paving the way for cooperative agreements in other spheres, such as trade. Hence the chances are good that Moscow is serious about its arms control proposals.

Yet the chances that Washington would accept a broad-reaching disarmament plan such as the Soviets have proposed seem slim. From the beginning, the Reagan administration has clearly been hostile to arms control: witness its abandonment of SALT II, its refusal to join the Soviets in their nuclear-test moratorium, and its insistence on developing, testing, and ultimately deploying a "Star Wars" ballistic-missile defense system in violation of existing treaty constraints. Ronald Reagan claims to favor dramatic reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals and to be eager for an arms control agreement; at the same time, he is committed to pursuing his Strategic Defense Initiative. The Soviets, like most observers, insist that the two goals are incompatible.

The one agreement that the two sides have managed to negotiate in the multilateral Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe owes its success to two factors. First, the accord involves no arms reductions, but rather "confidence-building measures," such as advanced notification of military exercises; and, second, the Soviets have allowed unprecedented procedures for on-site verification and "challenge" inspections on Soviet-bloc territory.

Agreement on significant arms reductions should prove far more difficult. On SDI and other nuclear arms control issues, Reagan seems adamant. Thus if there is to be an agreement it will have to be on his terms. If indeed the administration wants a major arms control accord, it aims at one that would enforce very particular conditions: the United States would be allowed to continue developing the weapons systems of its choice, while the Soviet Union would be forced to acquiesce to U.S. abrogation of its treaty commitments. What the White House does not want is an agreement that eliminates nuclear testing, reinforces the existing ban on antiballistic missile defenses, removes nuclear weapons from Europe, or prevents "modernization" of current arsenals.

Because the Reagan administration has taken such an entrenched posi-
tion, many observers have looked to the Soviets to make the compromises necessary for an agreement. But the Soviets have already made a number of concessions—accepting wide-scale, unrestricted deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), giving up their insistence on limiting short-range nuclear weapons in Europe, raising the proposed limits on their land-based intercontinental missiles from 3,600 to 4,800 warheads, and considering the prospect of permitting research and development of Star Wars systems. If the Soviets were to make any further compromises, they would essentially be adopting the Reagan position—abandoning a comprehensive test ban, allowing development of new offensive weapons, permitting U.S. testing and deployment of space-based weapons. This would damage not only their own but also U.S. and world security: a "compromise" agreement that officially abandons the long-standing objectives of arms control in favor of Reagan's objectives could be worse than no agreement at all. Thus, ironically, one of the principal dangers of the current situation is that Mikhail Gorbachev, in his eagerness to secure an arms agreement with the Reagan administration, might sign a treaty that in effect endorses a continuation of the arms race.

Almost certainly, Gorbachev is aware of this danger, and of the unlikelihood of the Reagan administration's bargaining in good faith. Thus Gorbachev's proposals have to be considered in the context of his overall objectives. It seems that the Soviet disarmament initiatives are part—perhaps even the "central direction," as Gorbachev puts it—of a broad-ranging agenda for change, in both domestic and foreign affairs. In this respect, Gorbachev's proposals are not aimed solely or even primarily at the Reagan administration. They are intended, rather, for the American public and Congress; for elites and publics in other countries, particularly Western Europe and the Pacific; and for domestic consumption in the Soviet Union.

**Gorbachev's Disarmament Diplomacy**

Mikhail Gorbachev is not the first Soviet leader to have made far-reaching disarmament proposals; Nikita Khrushchev, for example, put forward various plans for "general and complete disarmament" during the 1950s. The scope and intensity of Gorbachev's disarmament diplomacy do, however, mark a sharp break with the practice of his predecessors. Only a few months after he became general secretary, he made his first major initiative—a unilateral Soviet nuclear test moratorium, starting on the 40th anniversary of the U.S. atomic bombing of Hiroshima. The campaign then intensified with Gorbachev's address of January 15, 1986, in...
which he put forward a plan to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2000. It has since proceeded with elaborations, clarifications, and some surprising new initiatives, all backed up by an energetic and sophisticated diplomatic offensive.

Although Soviet negotiators, and Gorbachev himself, have moved beyond the specific details and timetables presented in the original speech, the January plan still constitutes the framework in which Gorbachev appears to work. The first stage of that plan was intended to begin in 1986. It envisaged that "within the next 5 to 8 years the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. [would] reduce by one-half the nuclear weapons that can reach each other's territory," down to a maximum of 6,000 warheads. In addition, the superpowers would undertake the total elimination of medium-range missiles, including the Soviet SS-20s and the U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles, "in the European zone." There would also be a U.S. pledge "not to transfer its strategic and medium-range missiles to other countries," a commitment by France and Britain "not to build up their respective nuclear arsenals," a joint Soviet-American moratorium on nuclear testing, and a renunciation by both superpowers of Star Wars systems.

Although Gorbachev repeated the long-standing Soviet argument that the "development of space-strike weapons will dash the hopes for reduction of nuclear armaments on earth," subsequent statements indicated considerable Soviet flexibility on the course that negotiations might take. In his speech at last February's 27th Party Congress, for example, Gorbachev stated that the Soviet Union was ready "to resolve the question of medium-range missiles in the European zone separately—without a direct connection to problems of strategic armaments and space," thereby making it clear that U.S.-Soviet differences over Star Wars need not prevent an accord on medium-range missiles. Indeed, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze has commented on several occasions that the European missiles constitute the "most promising area" for agreement.

If the remaining first-stage issues could be settled, the Soviet plan envisaged a second stage to begin in 1990. During the subsequent five to seven years, the other nuclear powers would join the disarmament process by freezing their arsenals and refraining from deploying nuclear weapons outside their borders. The superpowers would continue reducing medium-range weapons and would freeze their tactical nuclear systems. After U.S. and Soviet forces had been reduced by 50 percent (it is not clear whether this refers only to strategic forces or to tactical ones as well), the rest of the nuclear powers would eliminate their tactical nuclear systems—by Soviet definition, those with a range of up to 1,000 kilometers.
Also during the second stage, all industrialized states would agree to the prohibition of space weapons; all nuclear powers would stop nuclear testing; and a ban would come into effect on "the development of non-nuclear weapons based on new physical principles, whose destructive power is close to that of nuclear arms or other weapons of mass destruction."\textsuperscript{11} Such weapons were further defined by Marshal Sergei Akhromeev, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, as those "using physical principles never before used to hit personnel, military equipment and targets." These "might include ray, radio wave, infrasonic, geophysical, and genetic weapons," as well as some of the so-called deep-strike or emerging-technologies weapons that have come under increasing criticism in the West. "In their strike characteristics," Akhromeev argued, "these types of weapons might be no less dangerous than mass strike weapons."\textsuperscript{12} He declared at a Moscow press conference that the Soviet Union "has not carried out, nor does it intend to carry out, either tests of such armaments, or — even less so — the deployment of them. It will seek to ensure that all other countries also do not do so."\textsuperscript{13}

During the third stage, to begin no later than 1995, all remaining nuclear weapons would be eliminated. "By the end of 1999 there will be no nuclear weapons on earth. A universal accord will be drawn up that such weapons should never again come into being."\textsuperscript{14} Gorbachev proposed that these disarmament measures be verified through national technical means and on-site inspection; he added that "the U.S.S.R. is ready to reach agreement on any other additional verification measures."\textsuperscript{15}

This final stage is the least detailed of the three. It is in the first stage that the major obstacles to an agreement on eliminating nuclear weapons are found — the ban on space weapons, a comprehensive test ban, and a freezing of British and French nuclear arsenals. To help resolve these difficult issues, the Soviets have made a number of conciliatory gestures since Gorbachev's January 1986 speech. They have announced repeated extensions of their unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and even allowed private American scientists, under the sponsorship of the Natural Resources Defense Council, to set up seismic monitoring stations near Soviet test sites. At Geneva, the Soviet Union has tabled a number of proposals on strategic and medium-range weapons that the Reagan administration has seemed to find worth pursuing. In many respects, Moscow has moved closer to Western positions (although often at the expense of diluting Gorbachev's original proposals). For example, the Soviets now seem willing to allow "modernization" of French and British nuclear forces, as long as quantitative limits remain.\textsuperscript{16} They have promised to ease their opposi-
tion to Star Wars research, in return for a U.S. commitment not to abandon the ABM treaty for some years yet, and they have given up their attempt to limit sea-launched cruise missiles.

Such nuclear arms control proposals are of course a crucial focus of Gorbachev's disarmament diplomacy, but they are not its only focus—there have also been initiatives on conventional and chemical weapons and verification procedures. In a sequence of speeches, Gorbachev has proposed "substantial reductions in all the components of the land forces and tactical air forces of the European states and the relevant forces of the United States and Canada deployed in Europe." These reductions should cover the entire European territory, "from the Atlantic to the Urals" (a phrase Gorbachev borrowed from the European nuclear disarmament movement); there would be cutbacks of 25 percent by the early 1990s; the Soviets would allow on-site verification inspections of their relevant territory and exchange information about such matters as unit designations, numerical strengths, and types of armaments deployed. Gorbachev also suggested that an agreement could include the reduction of operational-tactical nuclear missiles—evidently an attempt to meet some West German criticisms that these weapons had been left out of the initial Soviet plan for eliminating SS-20 and other medium-range systems.17

The extent to which Gorbachev has been willing to move closer to Western positions was illustrated at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe held in Stockholm. For one thing, the Soviets dropped their insistence on advanced notification of large air exercises; such notifications would limit the use of European-based military forces for attacks against Third World countries, as in the U.S. bombing of Libya, and Moscow evidently recognized that the United States would never agree to such restrictions on its use of military power.18 Concerning their own land-based forces, by contrast, the Soviets consented to aerial inspection of military facilities as well as exercises, for the purpose of verifying compliance with any agreements made. Soviet flexibility on verification contributed much to the successful outcome of the Stockholm conference.

Verification has always been a sticking point in U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations. Thus it is worth noting that verification has figured prominently in a range of Gorbachev's proposals, not only those negotiated at Stockholm. When he called for intensified negotiations on chemical weapons, for example, Gorbachev drew particular attention to the issue of inspections.

We are prepared to make a timely announcement of the location of enterprises
producing chemical weapons and ensure the cessation of their production; we are ready to start developing procedures for destroying the corresponding industrial base and to proceed, soon after the convention enters into force, to eliminate the stockpiles of chemical weapons. All these measures would be carried out under strict control, including international on-site inspections.¹⁹

In April 1986, the Soviets tabled a specific proposal at the United Nations Committee on Disarmament. This plan called for identification and dismantling of chemical-weapons production facilities and provided for systematic international on-site inspection and supervision.²⁰

While many of his disarmament initiatives have focused on Western Europe and the United States, Gorbachev has by no means neglected Asia. In his speech to the 27th Party Congress, he maintained that “the significance of the Asian and Pacific Ocean direction is growing,” and he stressed the need to reduce the danger of military confrontation and “to stabilize the situation there.”²¹ During the following months, the Soviets put forward a number of concrete initiatives, including proposals for a Helsinki-style regional conference on security in Asia, support for a Pacific nuclear-free zone, overtures to China for mutual reduction of forces along the Sino-Soviet border, and pledges to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan and Mongolia.

One can hardly overestimate the significance of the Soviet disarmament proposals. They mark a dramatic break with the cautious approach of the Brezhnev generation. Such initiatives as the unilateral test moratorium and the acceptance of extensive on-site verification, including the presence of American scientists near Soviet test facilities, are particularly striking indications of how far the Soviets have been willing to come.

**Soviet Objectives**

Some observers have attributed Gorbachev’s disarmament diplomacy to two factors: his concern for the deteriorating Soviet economy, and the military pressure exerted on the Soviet Union by the Reagan military buildup. Of course, both these considerations have had an effect on the Soviet approach to arms control. There is little doubt that Gorbachev would like to reduce the Soviet defense burden and devote more resources to reviving the stagnant economy and raising the overall standard of living. In a full-employment economy like the Soviet Union, every ruble spent on defense is a ruble less for investment and consumption. By attempting to compete militarily with the United States, whose gross national product is
double that of the Soviet Union, the Soviets exact a substantial toll on their domestic economy.

New U.S. weapons systems also play into Moscow’s calculations about arms control—and in this sense, the Reagan buildup may have influenced Gorbachev’s disarmament offensive. Gorbachev and his colleagues are quite aware that a number of prominent American officials conceive of the arms race, and perhaps Star Wars in particular, as a way to bankrupt the Soviets by forcing them to compete in the area of advanced technology in which they lag behind. Furthermore, Star Wars troubles the Soviets for military reasons. In their view, if the United States combined its force of thousands of offensive weapons with an effective defense, it might conceivably carry out “a first strike with the hope that a retaliatory strike against American territory could be prevented.” The Soviets also perceive an inherent offensive threat in the new weapons themselves, as indicated by their referring to Star Wars as a program to develop “space-strike weapons.”

Yet it would be naive to see Gorbachev’s disarmament campaign as simply a reaction to the economic situation or to U.S. military programs. After all, his immediate predecessors faced similar internal and external constraints, yet they responded to them quite differently. Gorbachev seems to have judged, however, that the actions they took were not to the Soviet Union’s ultimate benefit, and that he would be wise to take another tack himself. In this regard, much of his program can be understood as an attempt to reverse the legacy of the Brezhnev era.

During Leonid Brezhnev’s tenure as general secretary, particularly the first half, the Soviet Union experienced considerable economic growth and a substantial improvement in the material welfare of its citizens. The country’s military potential increased steadily in almost all respects, it attained parity with the United States in strategic nuclear weapons, its political and territorial gains from World War II were sanctioned by international treaty, and its status as a superpower was widely acknowledged throughout the world. Yet in today’s Soviet Union, it is not these achievements for which Brezhnev is remembered. Rather, his legacy at home is one of declining growth rates, increasing consumer dissatisfaction, and a serious spiritual malaise that has manifested itself in rampant alcoholism, corruption, and crime. His international policy, with its abortive attempt at a superpower condominium and its excessive reliance on military power, is generally regarded as a failure.

In pursuing military parity and superpower status, Brezhnev sacrificed important political and economic objectives. As the Russian emigre satirist Vladimir Voinovich points out in an essay entitled “Zero Solution,”
a country's security depends not only on its military, but also on its economic potential. "And in questions of economics, even bourgeois propaganda cannot assert that we took advantage of detente or anything else to achieve superiority over the West. Quite the contrary," argues Voinovich. The Soviet Union has "steadily, irreversibly, and single-mindedly been reducing its economic potential" down "to a zero solution of its own." 24 The point, even if overstated for the sake of humor, is valid. The Soviet Union paid substantial costs in economic and political terms for its putative achievements in the military sphere.

There are plausible military justifications for the Soviets' buildup of SS-20s, increase of forces along the border with China, expansion of the Pacific fleet— even their invasion of Afghanistan. Yet Brezhnev's successors must wonder whether the security gains, assuming they were actually achieved, were worth the economic and political price. Gorbachev and his colleagues do not seem to think so. Indeed, in retrospect many of the Brezhnev initiatives appear counterproductive. The deployment of SS-20s, for instance, soured relations with Western Europe and constituted an ideal pretext for the deployment of new U.S. cruise and Pershing II missiles. The invasion of Afghanistan sent Soviet prestige in the Third World plummeting to new lows and further aggravated relations with China. For reasons such as these, Gorbachev seems intent on reversing the Brezhnev legacy. In particular, he seems willing to sacrifice certain military objectives in order to achieve political and economic gains that in the long run will enhance Soviet security.

Thus the Gorbachev disarmament offensive appears to be part of a broader foreign policy campaign, launched under the slogans of economic cooperation and common security. The Soviet leader has denounced the pursuit of unilateral military advantages and tried to emphasize the political and economic components of Soviet foreign policy. He has been particularly active in seeking improved relations with Western Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific region. In most of these areas, there has been a positive, if cautious, response to Soviet initiatives, and a recognition that a change in approach is clearly under way.

In his overtures to Western Europe, Gorbachev has sought to distance himself from the Brezhnev-era leaders. He has made a point of expressing an understanding of European security requirements, instead of imputing malign intentions to Western defense efforts. And he has stressed the importance of focusing on political and economic bases of cooperation rather than on issues of military confrontation. During his July 1986 meeting in Moscow with French President François Mitterrand, Gorbachev stated
that "it is necessary to rid political thinking of viewing Europe as a 'theater of operations.' . . . Europe must set an example of coexistence among sovereign, different but peaceful countries, countries aware of their interdependence and building their relations on trust."25

Even before this, Gorbachev had shown himself sympathetic to France's defense concerns. In an October 1985 speech to the French Parliament, he appeared to accept and even agree with the French position on nuclear disarmament. It "stands to reason," he said, that France should not want its nuclear weapons discussed without its participation, and he urged a "direct dialogue" on the subject with France as well as Britain. At the same time, he pointed out that France should be under no obligation to reduce its forces until the superpowers had made substantial progress in their own nuclear disarmament.26 The following July, in Moscow, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesperson Genadii Gerasimov reiterated that the "Soviet Union fully respects the right of France to be free to decide its own nuclear forces. Our position is that U.S. and Soviet missiles should be removed from Europe."27

Gorbachev made a good impression in Britain even before he became general secretary, during a 1984 visit; Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher characterized him as a man with whom one could do business. In mid-July 1986, Gorbachev sent Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to London. Mrs. Thatcher was evidently able to work with him as well—three agreements were signed. The most important of these, concerning the prevention of incidents at sea, was significant in that it was a bilateral accord between the Soviet Union and a U.S. ally on issues that are usually negotiated between the two superpowers or at least in multinational forums. In this regard, it set an important precedent.28

The Soviets probably do not expect to be able to negotiate major security issues directly with Margaret Thatcher's Britain. There appears to be far greater scope, however, for bilateral negotiations between Moscow and a future Labour government in London. Labour leaders found Soviet disarmament proposals attractive and urged the government to take them more seriously. Party leader Neil Kinnock complained that while Thatcher had accepted the "zero option" in 1984 when the Soviets rejected it, she had "moved the goalposts" now that Gorbachev had taken up the idea.29 The Labourites have also been doing some negotiating of their own with the Soviets. On record as favoring unilateral nuclear disarmament for Britain, Labour has sought concessions from Moscow in return for implementing such a policy in the future. For example, shadow Foreign Minister Denis Healey has proposed that when a future Labour govern-
ment scraps Britain's Polaris submarines the Soviet Union should dismantle an equivalent number of missiles. At a meeting with British parliamentarians in the Kremlin in May 1986, Gorbachev expressed support for the proposal.\textsuperscript{30} Given the lack of consensus within British society on the need for an independent nuclear force and the strong movement there for unilateral nuclear disarmament, the prospect of a future Anglo-Soviet agreement on nuclear arms reductions is not out of the question.

A number of the recent Soviet initiatives seem to have been directed mainly at West Germany. This is not surprising, considering the role that Germany has historically played in Russian security calculations. Currently, the Soviets appear concerned about the growing German-American cooperation on Star Wars research and the role the Bundeswehr might play in the so-called “Rogers Plan”—a strategy that gives NATO a more offensive orientation and stresses the deployment of new deep-strike weapons. In the past, the Soviets have tried to influence West German policy with threats of countermeasures and warnings about revanchism. These methods proved extremely counterproductive, however, and Gorbachev has tried a different approach. In a mid-April 1986 speech in East Berlin, he spoke to the West as follows: “Do not believe allegations about the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union. Our country will never, under any circumstances, begin armed operations against Western Europe unless we or our allies become targets of a NATO attack! I repeat, never!”\textsuperscript{31}

The change in tone has apparently been well received in West Germany, as have specific Soviet disarmament proposals. For example, because there is considerable popular concern in West Germany about chemical weapons, Gorbachev's proposals for banning them, in particular his acceptance of on-site inspection, “are very attractive to the German public.”\textsuperscript{32} This is especially the case because the Reagan administration has made little positive response to Gorbachev's offers, choosing instead to produce a new generation of binary nerve-gas weapons.

Perceiving an American inattentiveness to European concerns, the members of the West German opposition Social Democratic party (SPD) have, like their British counterparts, taken up the idea of negotiating directly with the Soviet Union. A resolution passed at an SPD congress in late summer 1986 maintains that “where the vital interests of European states are at stake Social Democrats will take their own initiatives”; it promises that a future SPD chancellor will have “full freedom to negotiate” with the Soviets. The SPD supports proposals to restructure the Bundeswehr to emphasize strictly defensive operations, and calls for the Warsaw Pact
to make similar changes, abandoning its emphasis on a tank-dominated strategy of rapid advance into Western Europe in the event of war.33

On other issues related to European security, Moscow has apparently continued to improve its standing relative to Washington’s, partly by abandoning many of the approaches of the Brezhnev era. For example, the East German Socialist Unity (Communist) party has engaged in discussions with the West German SPD on establishing a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. The United States opposes both the negotiations and their objective; Brezhnev’s advisors also had their doubts that the political and security gains of a nuclear-free Central Europe were worth the risk of letting East Berlin increase its ties to the West, possibly jeopardizing the Warsaw Pact’s cohesion. But under Gorbachev, the Soviet Union has allowed and perhaps has even encouraged East Germany’s negotiations with the SPD. In West Germany, the Soviets have made a symbolic break with the Brezhnev generation by replacing their aging ambassador with a much younger man—Iuli Kvitsinskii, a specialist on Germany who had attracted considerable attention and respect in that country in his previous job as chief negotiator on medium-range missiles in Europe.

Elsewhere in the world, the Soviets have undertaken similar measures to shed the Brezhnev legacy. During Brezhnev’s last decade in office, Soviet policy toward the Middle East—an area of both strategic and economic importance—suffered considerable setbacks. The Soviets had initially hoped to arbitrate the region’s conflicts jointly with the United States, but they soon found themselves completely frozen out of the peace process. Brezhnev’s military bluster had proved counterproductive during the 1973 war, and his tanks and aircraft were no match for the massive economic aid Washington used to lure away Moscow’s erstwhile client Egypt. Even the more radical states in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf could not be considered reliable Soviet allies. Moreover, the invasion of Afghanistan increased suspicions of Soviet intentions in the region. And the old adage that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” did not work with Iran: rather than profit from the turmoil there, the Soviets became the focus of hostility nearly as intense as that directed at the United States, a hostility magnified in the Soviets’ perceptions by the fact that they share a long border with Iran.

Gorbachev has had quite a task trying to reverse the decline of Soviet influence in the Middle East. His initiatives toward improved relations with Israel have attracted considerable attention in the U.S. media. Yet perhaps more important are the Soviet efforts to restore diplomatic contacts with traditionally pro-Western Arab states such as Oman and the United Arab Emirates, and to improve relations with Saudi Arabia as well.
Moscow has also made proposals for enhancing security in the region—for example, an offer of mutual withdrawal of Soviet and American fleets from the Mediterranean. Middle Eastern and North African countries must find such proposals especially attractive in light of the U.S. bombing of Libya—an action that was viewed as unwarranted aggression by most states in the region.34

Along with the disarmament proposals, the most dramatic moves in Soviet policy relate to the Pacific region. Brezhnev's military and diplomatic policies had brought Soviet standing there to an all-time low; they increased tensions with China and with U.S. allies such as Japan, Thailand, and Indonesia, while precluding the possibility that the Soviet Union could share in the region's growing economic prosperity. Gorbachev articulated a new approach on July 28, 1986 in a speech delivered in the Far Eastern Soviet port city of Vladivostok. He made a strong bid for improving relations with China, Japan, and the pro-U.S. members of ASEAN (the Association of South East Asian Nations). Moreover, he announced a number of specific initiatives, including the withdrawal of six regiments (about 6,000 troops) from Afghanistan and plans for a major reduction of Soviet forces in Mongolia, along the Chinese border.

In the context of the total Soviet presence in Afghanistan—estimated at 115,000 troops—the withdrawal of 6,000 men is insignificant, and may even have coincided with an intensification of Soviet military action there. Yet as far as China is concerned, this is a notable gesture. Beijing has identified “three obstacles” to improved Sino-Soviet relations; the war in Afghanistan is one of them, and the small Soviet pullback of troops suggests the possibility of an eventual settlement. The second obstacle—Soviet forces deployed along the Chinese border—may be addressed by Gorbachev's announced “substantial” withdrawal of troops from Mongolia and his proposal for “concrete steps aimed at proportionate lowering of the level of land forces” along the border with China. As a sign of goodwill, Gorbachev recently announced that Moscow accepted the Chinese position regarding a disputed territorial boundary along the Ussuri River.35

The final obstacle—Soviet support for the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia—was not directly addressed in Gorbachev's speech, and in the past the Soviets have suggested that they have little say over Vietnam's actions in Cambodia. Yet Gorbachev did allude to the possibility of a reduced Soviet military presence in the region. His promise that if the United States should “give up” its military bases in the Philippines "we would not leave this step unanswered" has been interpreted as an oblique
reference to a possible Soviet withdrawal from its major naval base at Cam
Ranh Bay in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{36}

So far, the Chinese have adopted a cautious, wait-and-see attitude toward
Soviet overtures. Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping has, however, stated that
he would be willing to meet with Gorbachev if there were some move-
ment on the Cambodian issue. As he put it, “If the Soviet Union can
contribute to the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, this
will remove the main obstacle in Chinese-Soviet relations.”\textsuperscript{37} It is not clear
whether this means that Deng is satisfied with Soviet gestures concerning
the other two obstacles or has elevated the Cambodian situation to “the
main obstacle” because it is the one the Soviets have neglected or cannot
do much about. In any case, though, the Chinese do seem to be attentive
to the new Gorbachev approach.

Moscow has also been trying a new approach to Soviet-Japanese rela-
tions. Here, too, the Brezhnev legacy, particularly the East Asian military
buildup and the invasion of Afghanistan, had contributed to a serious
deterioration. Gorbachev, by contrast, seems intent on taking a more con-
ciliatory tack. A week before the Vladivostok speech, for example, the
Soviets concluded an agreement to allow the Japanese to visit ancestral
graves on Soviet-held territory without special visas—the first time they
had been allowed to do so since 1975. The gesture in itself contributes
little to resolving the issue of the disputed territory—the four southern-
most Kuril Islands, which the Soviets have occupied since the end of World
War II—but it may represent an attempt to start a dialogue.\textsuperscript{38} As with
France, the Soviets have shown a new sensitivity to Japan’s perceptions
of its security requirements. At his first press conference, Moscow’s new
envoy to Tokyo, Nikolai Solovev, remarked that “it was not for the Soviet
Union to tell Japan what kind of relations it should have with the United
States” so long as they did not impinge on Soviet security. The fact that
Solovev is a career foreign-ministry specialist on Japan and that he deliv-
ered his remarks in fluent Japanese must suggest to Tokyo the importance
that Gorbachev attaches to Soviet-Japanese relations. And as with Moscow’s
new ambassador to West Germany, the fact that Solovev is, in his own
words, “two generations younger” than some of his predecessors must
enhance the public image of the new Soviet policy.\textsuperscript{39} All the same, how-
ever, the Japanese government has reacted warily to Gorbachev’s overtures.
It remains to be seen how successful he will be.

For Moscow, such success in improving relations with Japan and other
prosperous Asian countries is important for economic as well as political
reasons. Economic considerations were evidently behind Gorbachev’s sug-
gestion in the July speech that "with time, we might solve the question of opening Vladivostok"—a city that, as a major Soviet naval base, has always been closed to foreigners. Alluding to Peter the Great's founding of St. Petersburg (now Leningrad) in the early 18th century as Russia's "window to the west," Gorbachev announced that he would like Vladivostok "to be our widely opened window to the east."40 Some American observers familiar with the Soviet East Asian policy debate have maintained that Gorbachev was hinting at the possibility of turning Vladivostok into a "free economic zone," as the Chinese have done in certain areas. Apparently the Primorskii region surrounding the city has been identified as a prime candidate—the nearby port of Nakhodka already serves as a major conduit for Soviet trade with Pacific countries.41 This notion of opening Vladivostok is consistent with Soviet efforts to improve relations and trade with such countries as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, and to participate in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).42

In addition to mentioning the prospect of economic cooperation in the Pacific region, Gorbachev in his Vladivostok speech reiterated the new Soviet approach to "common security": "We require a radical break with traditions of political thinking." He criticized the "egotistical attempt to strengthen security at someone else's expense" (an approach Moscow has adopted not infrequently in the past) and put forward proposals for reductions of naval forces in the region, for a Pacific nuclear-free zone, and for a Helsinki-style conference on regional security.43

The Asian countries to which Gorbachev has directed his overtures, particularly Japan and the ASEAN members, have responded somewhat cautiously. Ironically, however, the Soviet position has probably been bolstered by the actions of the United States in the region. While Moscow urges negotiation of a regional nuclear-free zone, Washington drums its erstwhile ally New Zealand out of the ANZUS alliance in retaliation for that country's opposition to U.S. nuclear-armed ships using its ports. As the Soviet Union speaks of increasing economic cooperation in the region, the United States continues long-standing trade disputes with Japan and alienates Australia, another major Pacific ally, by undercutting its sales of wheat to the Soviets. While American fishing vessels have traditionally ignored the exclusive economic zones claimed by the island nations of the western Pacific, the Soviet Union has signed major commercial fishing agreements with a number of countries, such as Kiribati and Vanuatu, putting pressure on the United States to recognize their claims.
Domestic Constraints on Gorbachev

Because Soviet initiatives have clearly put the United States on the defensive in many areas of the world, U.S. officials have tended to dismiss them as propaganda, devoid of any substance. There is no doubt that the Soviets intend their new flexibility to contrast favorably with U.S. intransigence, and that they are quite sensitive to public perceptions of their diplomatic efforts. This is no reason, however, to dismiss the new Soviet proposals. The fact that they address traditional Soviet security and economic concerns, albeit in a far more creative way than in the past, means that they should be taken seriously. Furthermore, the attempt to abandon the Brezhnev legacy has apparently met with some internal resistance and has been pursued at some risk to Gorbachev's leadership. His willingness to accept those risks further attests to his seriousness.

In some respects, Gorbachev's disarmament offensive may be intended to flush out and identify the domestic opponents of his policies—even to put them on the defensive. If his foreign policy initiatives are indeed part of a larger plan to revive the civilian economy, Gorbachev must soon face the issue of transferring resources from the military sector. His stress on the "new thinking" necessary in the foreign policy sphere may be intended to build a momentum behind his disarmament program that could help in the inevitable domestic debates over allocation of resources. In his speech at the 27th Congress, Gorbachev made a remark that has traditionally been taken to mean that it is time to focus attention on other claimants to the country's resources than the military. Instead of arguing that external threats required increases in the military budget, Gorbachev maintained that "today we can declare with all responsibility that the defense might of the U.S.S.R. is supported at such a level that permits the reliable defense of the peaceful labor and peaceful life of the Soviet people." According to the original Russian text, this remark was met with "prolonged applause." Compare this assessment with comments Brezhnev made at a meeting of Soviet military leaders in October 1982, shortly before his death: "we should tirelessly strengthen the defenses of our country and be vigilant"; given the international situation, "the level of combat readiness of the army and navy should be even higher."

Certain remarks Gorbachev made at the 27th Congress implied that many among the Soviet leadership still shared Brezhnev's views—an indication that he may have been meeting some internal resistance, particularly to his continued attempts to improve relations with an apparently
intractable American government. In his closing speech, the general secretary chided potential opponents of his policy:

Now, too, the militaristic, aggressive forces would of course prefer to preserve and perpetuate the confrontation. But what should we do, comrades? Slam the door? It is possible that this is just what we are being pushed into doing. But we very clearly realize our responsibility for the destinies of our country and for the destinies of the world. We do not intend, therefore, to play into the hands of those who would like to force mankind to get used to the nuclear threat and to the arms race.47

Gorbachev’s policies may be objectionable particularly to Soviet military leaders, who are perhaps "concerned that a thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations may weaken their grip on the economy’s quality resources."48 Thus Gorbachev could run into trouble with his military officers if he pursues too conciliatory a policy toward Washington, especially if his gestures are not reciprocated. A case in point would be the unilateral Soviet test moratorium. Some Soviet scientists involved in arms control policy have intimated to their American colleagues that important segments of the military do indeed oppose this gesture.

On the other hand, it is possible to argue that some Soviet officers, particularly the younger ones, favor Gorbachev’s emphasis on internal economic reform. Even such a senior figure as Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov has emphasized after Engels that the basis for a strong defense is a strong economy.49 Major General M. Iasiukov, writing in October 1985, also stressed the link between civilian technological advances and military power. He called for “the acceleration of scientific-technical progress” and identified fundamentally new instruments, such as computer-controlled machines, robot equipment, and the latest generation computers, as “basic catalysts of military-technical progress.”50 One could imagine a coalition of such officers joining to support near-term restraints on Soviet military spending in the interest of long-term economic and military strength.51 Potential members of such a coalition might include those officers who have participated extensively in arms control negotiations, whose arguments in favor of a political approach to common security are undoubtedly heard by Soviet as well as Western audiences.

Gorbachev does seem to have achieved some success in convincing the military to go along with this political approach to security problems. Consider, for example, one of the major Soviet concessions made in the January speech—the offer to dismantle all SS-20s targeted on Europe, while allowing French and British forces to remain. Previously, the lowest number of SS-
20s that Moscow seemed willing to contemplate keeping—about 140 systems—would still have been enough to destroy the most important fixed military targets in Western Europe.32 The proposed elimination of all SS-20s within range of Europe suggests that these targets would have to be covered by other systems, such as intercontinental or variable-range missiles, which from a military standpoint would probably be less than ideal. With this in mind, one should not dismiss lightly the explanation that General Iurii Lebedev gave—albeit for the benefit of Western reporters—to account for Gorbachev’s position on the SS-20. Lebedev explained it as a “political decision” taken by the Politburo, explicitly overriding the military considerations that had originally led to the SS-20 deployment. He stated that Gorbachev was trying to prove that “the political dimension of security should begin to replace the strictly military dimension before parity alone no longer serves as a deterrent.”53

This interpretation, if correct, reinforces the impression that a central aspect of Gorbachev’s disarmament diplomacy is his willingness to sacrifice some military objectives for political benefit, and that he has persuaded an important segment of the military to go along with this approach. In the fall of 1985, for example, the Soviets began unilaterally withdrawing some 54 SS-20 missiles from Europe in order to bring the number down to the 243 that had been in place before the United States began installing its Pershing II and cruise missiles. For political reasons, then—to demonstrate its seriousness about arms control—Moscow was withdrawing its countermeasures to the new missiles even as the U.S. deployments continued. This must have been a hard move for the Soviet military to accept.54

Another sign of Gorbachev’s success at handling opposition from the military is his extension of the unilateral nuclear-test moratorium. “Obviously,” he said in his January 1986 speech, “the adoption of such a decision has by no means been simple for us. The Soviet Union cannot display unilateral restraint with regard to nuclear tests indefinitely.”55 These kinds of statements are obviously self-serving, but historical precedent does suggest that Gorbachev was probably coming under increasing pressure from his military officers and weapons designers to resume testing. Gorbachev’s predecessor Nikita Khrushchev revealed in his “memoirs” that he had been subject to such pressure during a previous test moratorium.56 Yet unlike Khrushchev, Gorbachev has resisted the pressure and extended the moratorium several times.

One important indication of Gorbachev’s power to shape the new Soviet security policy is his acceptance of the principle of extensive verification measures, including on-site and aerial inspection of Soviet territory.
Although for a long time the Soviet Union had been moving toward acceptance of greater verification provisions, especially during negotiations toward a comprehensive test ban, the new offers go far beyond past proposals. In the short run, the Soviets would sacrifice some of the secrecy they have traditionally considered crucial to security; in the long run, though, they would gain in security by fostering the mutual trust that makes disarmament measures possible. Again, Gorbachev has apparently persuaded the military of the wisdom of his approach—or in any case overruled their objections. How long he can continue to do so is an open question.

Gorbachev's Options

Although many of Gorbachev's disarmament overtures have been directed toward Europe and Japan, they need not be viewed as attempts to split the United States from its allies, as some have warned. It appears, rather, that Gorbachev has adopted a two-track strategy. Maintaining a conciliatory approach toward the United States while expanding diplomatic contacts with Europe, China, and Japan are in fact mutually reinforcing activities. In one respect, appearing receptive to U.S. initiatives is a prerequisite to establishing credibility among American allies. At the same time, however, the Soviets can benefit from the pressure that Europe and Japan put on the United States to reach an arms control agreement that would constrain future competition in space-based weapons. Either way, the Soviets win. If they secure a meaningful agreement with the United States, fine. If instead the Reagan administration proves intransigent in the eyes of American allies in Europe and Japan, the Soviet Union strengthens its position with those countries.

Still, Gorbachev's persistent search for a U.S.-Soviet arms control compromise indicates that such an accord remains an important part of his approach to economic and security problems. His optimal solution would probably include a comprehensive U.S.-Soviet settlement, along the lines of his January proposal, that would halt the arms race in space and allow for substantial reductions in nuclear and conventional forces.

It is useful to consider Gorbachev's effort in light of a past effort by a Soviet leader to reach such an agreement—Nikita Khrushchev's campaign for major nuclear and conventional disarmament during the mid-1950s. In many respects, Gorbachev's position today is similar to Khrushchev's in 1955. Gorbachev is probably at a comparable stage, for example, in his consolidation of power. He came into office after an extended period of decline and stagnation in Soviet economy and society, vowing to reorder
the country toward economic acceleration and radical reform. Like Khrushchev, he could use a major success in foreign policy to bolster his internal authority. He could also profit from the kind of “breathing space” that an improvement in the international climate might permit.

Furthermore, if key measures of the Gorbachev disarmament plan were implemented, they could benefit Soviet security much as Khrushchev’s proposals of the 1950s would have done. They would reduce the American nuclear threat in Europe, halt the quantitative buildup of British and French nuclear arsenals, allow for conventional troop reductions, perhaps contribute to a lessening of political tension and the danger of war, and forestall a new generation of U.S. weapons based on microelectronics and other advanced technologies.

Of all the reasons for Soviet interest in serious disarmament measures with the United States, the desire to restrain the qualitative or technological arms race figures perhaps most prominently. This does not mean, as some have argued, that the Reagan administration’s hard-line approach and particularly its pursuit of Star Wars technologies have “brought the Soviets to the bargaining table.” True, the Soviets have been concerned that their military technology lags behind America’s—a concern reflected in their expanded efforts in recent years to acquire militarily relevant Western technology through both legal and illegal means. But the expansion of that effort predates the Reagan administration by many years; indeed, Soviet concerns about American weapons innovations go back to the very beginning of the nuclear arms race. Thus it is not surprising that the Soviets should seek to forestall such innovations through arms control. In fact, reducing the risk of war by preventing potentially destabilizing developments in weapons technology has long been a traditional goal of U.S. arms-control advocates as well.

The Soviet adoption of this objective has been reinforced by the historical pattern of the arms race. At the core of the Soviet-American military competition lies the relationship between technological innovation and the accumulation of new weapons. Here a pattern has emerged: the United States typically originates technologically innovative arms systems; the Soviet Union first counters them, then imitates and produces them in large number. As a result, weapons that are initially touted as offering the United States a major advantage end up redounding to both sides’ disadvantage when the Soviets adopt them as well. Moscow, at least, now seems to recognize that this practice yields unpredictable, costly, and potentially dangerous consequences.

Rather than trying to counter new weapons, the Soviet Union would
prefer to negotiate restraints on them; in order to get such restraints, the Soviets appear to be willing to make concessions in their area of strength—the high-volume production and deployment of weapons based on familiar technologies. In the mid-1950s, Khrushchev was willing to undertake substantial reductions in conventional weapons and forces—Moscow’s area of strength—in order to prevent the widescale deployment of an American technological innovation—tactical nuclear weapons—in Europe. The United States, unfortunately, was unwilling to sacrifice its technological lead. Thus passed a rare “moment of hope” that some observers have compared to the situation today.61

It is possible that today’s moment of hope will pass as well. The Reagan administration’s reactions to the recent Soviet initiatives have not boded well for the conclusion of a meaningful agreement—at least not the kind of comprehensive one Moscow would prefer. Despite the major concessions the Soviets have made, the Reagan administration has offered very little in return.

Although Gorbachev appears to favor a broad-reaching disarmament agreement of the sort he proposed in January 1986, his statements suggest that he is willing to entertain any number of compromise accords along the way. He seems to have expected to get an agreement fairly quickly—for example, in time for a summit—on either medium-range missiles in Europe or a test ban. For this reason, he risked major conciliatory gestures—essentially accepting the American position in the former case, and maintaining a long-term unilateral moratorium and allowing on-site monitoring in the latter. Further, he maintained that both issues could be settled before resolving the more divisive question of SDI. All these moves, however, met with intransigence in the White House.

It is not surprising that the Soviets should have expected an early agreement on medium-range missiles. Their proposal was very close to the zero option that President Reagan had put forward in 1982. The United States proposed that the Soviet Union destroy all its SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 medium-range systems worldwide. In return, the United States would refrain from deploying its new Pershing II and cruise missiles—but it would not limit its forward-based systems in Europe or allow the Soviets any compensation for British and French systems. In essence, the zero option created an artificial category of medium-range land-based missiles, in which the Soviets had an advantage, while ignoring compensatory Western advantages in forward-based aircraft, submarines assigned to NATO, and nuclear-armed planes on aircraft carriers.

Those in the Reagan administration who supported the zero option
favored it not as a realistic proposal but for its propaganda value. They hoped—correctly as it turned out—that Soviet rejection of the Reagan offer would help prepare European public opinion for deployment of the new American missiles. In his memoirs, Alexander Haig, then secretary of state, admitted that the Reagan proposal was entirely one-sided and held no hope of gaining Soviet acceptance. Indeed, he felt that the proposal would "generate suspicion that the United States was only interested in a frivolous propaganda exercise or, worse, that it was disingenuously engaging in arms negotiations simply as a cover for a desire to build up its nuclear arsenal."65

Yet, remarkably, this very proposal is more or less what Gorbachev has put forward. The one point on which the earlier zero option and Gorbachev’s offer differed concerned Soviet SS-20s in Asia. Washington wanted them all scrapped, while Moscow was only willing to freeze them at current levels. Just a week before Gorbachev’s January speech, though, U.S. negotiators were reportedly preparing to present a zero option-Asia freeze package to the Soviet delegation in Geneva. Thus Gorbachev was literally proposing the Reagan administration’s own plan on medium-range missiles. The Soviets had acquiesced in an artificial definition of what was to be negotiated, thereby obliging themselves to make the most significant concessions—which they have done. The administration, then, was basically forced to admit that it did not in fact favor a zero option. It proposed instead that each side merely reduce the number of its medium-range missiles. The Soviets in turn compromised again, moving closer to the new American position: Moscow reportedly proposed an interim agreement allowing each side 100 warheads on medium-range systems in Europe.

The Soviets have been similarly forthcoming on the test-ban issue. Yet the more concessions they make, the more creative the Reagan administration becomes in thinking up reasons for refusing to join the moratorium. Administration efforts to justify rejection of a comprehensive test ban have an onion-like quality to them: as one layer of rationale becomes discredited, another appears in its place. At first the White House argued that the unilateral moratorium cost the Soviets nothing—that they had already completed their testing for the year. With each new extension, however, it has gotten increasingly difficult for the administration to maintain this stance. The Soviets have forgone some 20 to 30 tests that they would normally have conducted during a typical year. From the point of view of the Soviet military, this restraint has clearly imposed some costs on its program and, thus, has probably elicited considerable criticism from
the officer corps. So administration officials have shifted gears, proffering reasons why a comprehensive Soviet-American test ban would be undesirable in principle; these included the notion that it would encourage other countries to develop nuclear weapons—a contention that Representative Edward Markey dismissed as "patently ridiculous and Orwellian."65

On the issue of verification, the Soviets attempted to resolve the administration's doubts by agreeing to on-site inspections and finally by inviting American scientists to install seismic monitoring devices near Soviet test sites. An official at a U.S. nuclear weapons laboratory countered with the claim that the Soviets could cheat by testing in outer space: "They could go beyond Mars, in which case we'd have to go beyond Mars to measure it."66

Ironically, the "concession" that the Reagan administration would most like the Soviets to make would be to resume their nuclear testing, which would relieve pressure on the United States to justify its own tests. President Reagan has also expressed interest in an agreement to continue testing on a limited basis, with a ceiling on the number of tests per year. Such a measure would do little to restrain the arms race, and would squander the major opportunity the Soviet moratorium presents on a long-standing U.S. arms control goal—a comprehensive test ban.

On the issue of SDI, the Soviets have moved from total rejection of any defense-oriented research to trying to strengthen the ABM treaty as a means of forestalling the Star Wars program. They have suggested that each party commit itself to abiding by the treaty for up to 10 to 15 years, and have offered major reductions in their strategic forces in return. The Reagan administration has suggested it would be willing to abide by the treaty only for seven and a half more years and provided that the Soviets agree to accept deployment of Star Wars thereafter—a cynical proposal, as it would be technically impossible to deploy a meaningful defense in so short a time. If Gorbachev signed such an accord, he would be helping to dismantle a treaty that his own chief of the general staff characterized as the most important "barrier on the road to a strategic arms race."67

The Soviets have made substantial compromises in an attempt to reach an accord with the Reagan administration. They have agreed to exclude French and British medium-range missiles from an agreement and perhaps even to permit their modernization; they have accepted the American definition of what medium-range systems should be covered; and they have allowed for higher ceilings on strategic warheads and left unrestricted the wide-scale deployment of U.S. sea-launched cruise missiles. Yet Gorbachev has found it difficult to get the Reagan administration to accept even its own proposals, such as the zero option, let alone traditional U.S.
arms control objectives like a comprehensive test ban. Moscow cannot move much closer to the Reagan position of “more weapons, less arms control” before the whole exercise becomes meaningless. The contrast between the conciliatory Soviet proposals and the unyielding U.S. response was perhaps best captured by a Jules Feiffer cartoon’s prediction for January 1988 (based no doubt on the events of two years earlier): “Administration rejects Soviet offer to dissolve Politburo and restore Czar as ‘nothing new’ . . . Reagan’s ratings soar.”68

If there is going to be a major nuclear arms agreement, it will clearly have to be on Reagan’s terms. The prospects for a broader Soviet-American accord, along the lines of Gorbachev’s original disarmament proposal, are poor indeed. This leaves Gorbachev with three basic options in the realm of security. He could abandon negotiations with Washington as futile, yield to Soviet hawks, and engage in an unbridled arms race at the expense of economic modernization. Alternatively, he could accept a Reagan-style arms agreement that might lower ceilings on offensive forces while legitimating development of strategic defenses, thereby channeling the arms competition into space weapons, antitactical ballistic missile systems in Europe, and high-tech conventional weaponry. Or, finally, he could let the United States conduct the arms race by itself, and instead pursue multilateral security agreements in Europe and Asia and rely on unilateral restraint and improved trade relations to create a strong domestic economy. This last option could include continuing formal negotiations with the Reagan administration, so as not to alienate U.S. public opinion, but with little expectation of agreement.

The first option—an unrestrained arms race—would yield the Soviets little benefit. Although in principle it would be possible for Gorbachev to justify abandoning his ambitious economic plans on the basis of U.S. intransigence and an increased American military threat, in practice the costs to his personal prestige, to the Soviet economy, and to the Soviet people would be intolerably high.

Moreover, Gorbachev has, perhaps intentionally, made it difficult for himself to make such an about-face. For instance, he allowed publication in Pravda of the full transcript of remarks delivered in his presence by foreign scientists who argued that the Soviets should adhere to the unilateral test moratorium even in the face of U.S. intransigence. Princeton University Professor Frank von Hippel, for one, stressed that no new nuclear weapons can alter the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union are capable of destroying each other. Other Western scientists maintained that the Soviets should not fear falling behind the United States by
prolonging the moratorium.69 By publicizing such arguments, Gorbachev appears to suggest that he agrees with them.

He seems to have tied his hands in other ways as well. During a September 1986 interview with the Czechoslovak newspaper Rudé Právo, which was widely reprinted in Soviet publications including the ministry of defense daily, he said of the United States and, indirectly, of his own country: “If you want military superiority, then you don’t need a moratorium; if you want to continue the arms race, especially to transfer it to new spheres, to outer space, then you don’t need a moratorium.”70 Addressing the issue of the environmental impact of nuclear testing, Gorbachev spoke on Soviet television, arguing that “continued testing inflicts a tremendous and perhaps not yet fully understood harm on the environment, on the natural surroundings in which we all live. Do we not feel obliged to show concern for our own home? And not only for ourselves, but for our children and grandchildren.”71 It seems unlikely that Gorbachev would want to be accused of the same charges he levels at the United States, as he would be if he broke off negotiations, resumed Soviet testing, and embarked on a new arms buildup. It is more likely that he will try to avoid “slamming the door” in this fashion as long as possible, at least until a new U.S. administration comes into office.

The second security option open to Gorbachev—signing agreements that endorse a continued arms race—would not benefit the Soviets much either. Gorbachev seems to recognize this point in regard to the test ban, for example. He told Rudé Právo that he would never be satisfied with “a compromise between the Soviet and American positions” on nuclear tests—“that is, not a complete prohibition, but some kind of ‘regulation’ of them.” He claimed not to reject compromise in general, but said that “the idea of ‘regulation’ instead of a ban appears to me incorrect in principle.”72 Thus while Gorbachev is willing to negotiate accords that contribute to Soviet security—such as measures agreed to at the Conference on Disarmament at Stockholm—he is unlikely to accept the Reagan administration’s definition of a good arms control agreement: namely, dumping the ABM and SALT II treaties and pursuing an arms race in space-based defensive weapons. Gorbachev’s signing such an agreement would be plausible only if he were under a great deal of internal pressure to cut some kind of deal with the Americans, which he could then use to justify restraint in Soviet military programs. A Reagan-style agreement would, however, probably be more useful to Gorbachev’s opponents to legitimate a military buildup, especially in defensive weapons.

Such an outcome would only exacerbate Soviet economic difficulties.
This is something that Reagan administration officials seem to get backwards: they commonly argue that the Soviets’ economic difficulties will drive them to make the kind of arms control agreement the White House wants, when actually it is the Reagan-style accord that would impose great costs on the Soviet economy. In contrast to the original Gorbachev disarmament plan, which would reduce nuclear and conventional forces and prevent an arms race in space, the American proposal would encourage the Soviets to match a U.S. Star Wars defense, continue nuclear testing, deploy sea-launched cruise missiles, pursue further modernization of tactical nuclear forces, and invest in advanced-technology conventional weapons. The U.S. proposal is not arms control, and it certainly won’t save the Soviets any money. The way for the Soviet Union to revitalize its economy is not to endorse continued military competition through “arms control” with the Reagan administration, but to reduce defense commitments and expenditures and seek outside sources of technology and trade.

This is the objective that seems to drive Gorbachev’s disarmament diplomacy, and it helps explain why his focus is far broader than the negotiating table at Geneva. In his Rudé Právo interview, Gorbachev specifically addressed the impact of military spending on the economy. Referring to possible “attempts to undermine the U.S.S.R. economically by means of an arms race,” he stated that “we will do everything so as not to allow this malicious plan to come true,” by acting on the diplomatic, military, political, propaganda, and “above all, the economic” level. Gorbachev repeated his themes about improved productivity and management from past speeches, and added that “the quality work of the Soviet people and the working people of the countries of the socialist community is simultaneously a contribution to the cause of peace.” If we are weak economically, Gorbachev argued, “the pressure from the enemies of socialism intensifies.” But, if “we become stronger, more solid economically, and on the social and political level, the interest of the capitalist world in normal relations with us will grow.” These are not the words of a person willing to abandon his plans for economic revival in order to engage in an all-out arms race with the United States.

This is not to say, however, that Gorbachev’s third security option—unilateral restraint—would be an easy one to adopt. At the current stage of the arms race, the United States continues to deploy its latest generation of highly accurate, “hard-target kill” missiles, which include the MX, Trident D-5, Pershing II, and cruise. The United States is also pursuing advanced technologies for information processing, sensors, target-
acquisition, and other areas relevant to a Star Wars defense as well as to deep-strike conventional systems. The Soviets, by contrast, are only now completing an enormously expensive deployment of multiple-warhead strategic missile systems of improved accuracy, and appear to be seeking to match U.S. advances in other areas such as cruise-missile technology and more accurate submarine-launched long-range missiles. They also lag behind the United States in those areas deemed most crucial to Star Wars, including microelectronics and computer software.73 One has to wonder, then, if the Soviets would be willing to impose unilateral restraint on their military programs for the sake of economic reform even if it meant letting the United States forge ahead in the arms race.

There is evidence to suggest that they might—that they would consider opting out of the arms race numbers game and that they no longer see the urgency of matching every American development. This evidence is found not only in the writings of Soviet academics involved in policy guidance,74 but also in the statements of senior military officers. Marshal Ogarkov, for example, the former chief of the general staff, has argued that the two superpowers have "created a surplus of military and especially nuclear capabilities." He claimed that "given the quantity and variety of nuclear missile systems that have been achieved, it is simply impossible for an aggressor to destroy with a single strike the analogous systems of the other side"; a crushing retaliatory strike would become inevitable. Furthermore, the stockpiles of nuclear weapons that the two sides have accumulated "from a military point of view seem truly absurd." "One need not be a military specialist," added Ogarkov, "to understand that a further buildup of them is becoming simply senseless."75 The logical implication of Ogarkov's arguments is that the Soviets need not be so concerned about maintaining an exact numerical parity with the United States in nuclear weapons, but rather could afford to risk unilateral reductions. It is too early to tell whether this is the inference Gorbachev has drawn. His proposal to dismantle Soviet SS-20s without compensatory cuts in British and French forces may, however, reflect the influence of this kind of thinking.

This more sophisticated approach also seems to be guiding the Soviets' ideas about how to respond to the U.S. Star Wars program. Evidently, some of Gorbachev's top advisors on space policy have been explaining to him what is quite obvious to American experts as well: it will be much cheaper to defeat a Star Wars system than to build one. As Gorbachev pointed out at the November 1985 Geneva summit, "our answer [to Star Wars] will be effective, less costly, and can be carried out in a shorter time."76
In remarks made to Soviet audiences, Gorbachev stressed that if the United States proceeds with Star Wars “we will find a convincing response, and not at all necessarily in outer space.” He argued that the Soviet Union can match the United States in military technology but that Moscow would prefer not to follow “the absurd American logic of armaments.” Soviet opposition to space-strike weaponry was not “a question of fear of falling behind,” he insisted, but “a question of responsibility”; the Soviet answer to attempts to ruin its economy through an arms race would be to build a stronger economy, since “a strong, healthy economy guarantees the success of a policy of peace. This is the link between domestic and foreign policy.”

The Soviets may decide, then, to undertake inexpensive countermeasures to SDI, so as not to sacrifice their domestic economic objectives. In the short term, the current force of Soviet strategic missiles constitutes the cheapest countermeasure. The Soviets could also deploy more real or “dummy” warheads on existing missiles, in order to overwhelm a U.S. defense. To foil American plans for “boost-phase intercept” of Soviet missiles as they are launching, the Soviets could produce large numbers of unarmed rocket boosters to saturate that layer of the Star Wars defense. Such a response would draw on existing Soviet strengths in high-volume production of missiles. In the somewhat longer term, the Soviets could develop fast-burn boosters that could launch missiles before the U.S. interceptors had time to respond. The Soviets could also emphasize means of evading U.S. radars by deploying low-flying cruise missiles and using “stealth” technologies. Indeed, their willingness to forgo restrictions on sea-launched cruise missiles may stem from a perception that these weapons would be a relatively inexpensive way to defeat an American defense: small cruise missiles could be widely deployed on Soviet ships, including merchant vessels, and would go virtually undetected.

Whatever countermeasures the Soviets might eventually employ, they do want to develop many of the technologies Star Wars is based on—particularly computers and microelectronics, which are essential for the kind of “intensive” economic development that the Soviets want to pursue. Yet this does not necessarily mean, as some Western observers have argued, that Gorbachev welcomes Star Wars, that indeed “SDI is a godsend for the Soviet leadership” because it bolsters their arguments for economic reform. In his July 1986 meeting with Soviet and foreign scientists, Gorbachev devoted a large portion of his remarks to the question of whether “SDI is the path to the development of science, to new heights of scientific-technological progress.” “Is it true,” he asked, “that we can’t move science and technology, all the components of scientific knowledge, including the
creation of new materials, radioelectronics, mathematics and so forth by carrying out peaceful projects." He then went into great detail, listing the advances that had been achieved through international scientific cooperation in such areas as space exploration, and concluded that the "argument that science and technology can be developed only with the help of an arms race is an absurd argument."\textsuperscript{81}

If Gorbachev means what he says, he may focus Soviet resources directly on economic reform in the civilian sector at the expense of military programs—regardless of what the United States does. Rebuilding the civilian technological base in this fashion would in turn strengthen Moscow's future military potential. By the same token, Gorbachev must be familiar with, and draw comfort from, the forecast many in the West have made—that if Ronald Reagan’s commitment to Star Wars is maintained by subsequent administrations it will contribute to a weakening of the American economy and will even drain resources from other U.S. military programs. Gorbachev may also be taking into account the likelihood of increased conflict within NATO over Star Wars if the Soviets reject the "logic" of the arms race and refuse to build a high-profile space-based defense of their own.

Thus, even in the absence of a "grand compromise" agreement with the United States—to abandon Star Wars in return for major reductions in Soviet land-based missiles—Gorbachev could be willing to pursue many of his disarmament initiatives in the expectation that they would yield substantial political and economic dividends. After all, the nuclear arms race and the near-term costs of countering SDI are not the primary military drain on Soviet resources. The most direct way for the Soviets to economize on the military budget is to demobilize soldiers, releasing them for much-needed labor in the civilian sector, and to slow procurement of conventional armaments.\textsuperscript{82} While the cost of maintaining large numbers of conscripted troops is relatively less than the cost of the U.S. volunteer army, the opportunity costs of keeping millions of workers out of the Soviet labor force for years at a time are great indeed—especially during a period of declining growth in labor productivity and a shrinking labor supply in the country's main industrial regions.

This consideration makes Gorbachev's conciliatory overtures toward Western Europe and the Pacific all the more central to his security policy and his plans for economic revival. Improved relations with China, for example, may permit large reductions in Soviet military forces along the Sino-Soviet border. The Chinese themselves are in the midst of cutting back their army by one million, and seem willing to come to some accom-
mation with the new Soviet leadership. Gorbachev would also like to staunch the "bleeding wound," as he characterized Afghanistan, and "in the nearest future to bring back to the homeland the Soviet troops" stationed there. Moreover, he is eager to decrease the perception of a "Soviet threat" in Western Europe, hoping that an easing of tensions there could allow for some reduction in the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe.

The economic component of Gorbachev's strategy appears to focus on the newly industrializing countries (NICs)—specifically on large, moderate Third World regimes such as India, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia. The Soviets may hope to improve relations with these countries in order to open up their markets to Soviet goods, the ultimate goal being to use the competitive pressures of the export market to modernize Soviet industry. This might hurt the Soviet consumer in the short run, but over the long run could be highly beneficial to the Soviet economy, bringing it into the third industrial revolution. While courting moderate Third World countries, perhaps with these economic objectives in mind, the Soviets have simultaneously toned down their rhetorical support of revolutionary states and movements in the Third World. Thus the Soviets appear to be coordinating their economic and military policies, pointing them both in a new direction.

One should not overstate the coherence of current Soviet policy—Gorbachev may not have the kind of "grand strategy" for military and economic security that is described here. Some elements of such an approach are evident, though, and they do differ substantially from the policies pursued by Gorbachev's predecessors. It is worthwhile, then, to consider the implications Gorbachev's new approach has for U.S. policy.

U.S. Security Interests

It would be ironic indeed if the Soviets chose the course of unilateral restraint in the military sphere in order to develop their full economic potential—a course that a number of Americans have urged their own country to follow. Moscow would adopt such a course in response to U.S. unwillingness to agree to mutual arms reductions. Thus, as the United States squandered resources on an unworkable Star Wars defense, at the expense of its industrial competitiveness and its citizens' standard of living, the Soviets would have opted for a broader definition of security—one that depends on a strong economy at home and skillful diplomacy abroad.

Certainly, this overstates the likelihood that Gorbachev's third alternative course can be successfully pursued, if it is indeed the one he chooses.
He faces many obstacles, both at home and abroad. And in the face of U.S. provocations, the internal opposition to Gorbachev's policies could be strengthened; pressures for immediate increases in military spending might prevail against more rational arguments for long-term investment in civilian technological development.

It is possible that Moscow will exercise some restraint in its military policies until a new U.S. administration comes to office, thereby keeping the door open to comprehensive negotiations with the next president. There are compelling reasons, however, to try to reach an agreement with the Soviets before that time. First, Soviet forbearance has its limits, which cannot be predicted. The Soviets may well decide to break out of the constraints of existing treaties; because of the nature of the Soviet system, they could marshal their resources and multiply the nuclear threat to the United States fairly quickly and effectively. Second, Washington may never be in a better position than now to make a major settlement with the Soviets. By the early 1990s, the United States may have spent billions of dollars demonstrating to the world that a space-based missile defense is in fact not feasible. It should also be obvious by that time that the Reagan military spending binge has had tremendously negative domestic and international economic consequences. If the Soviets, by contrast, have held their military spending to more moderate levels, they may feel in a stronger bargaining position. Many of the concessions that Gorbachev offered in January 1986 may have long since been withdrawn.

Thus U.S. security interests would be best served by an agreement, concluded within the near term, that imposes mutual restraints on Soviet and U.S. military programs. Such an accord would incorporate the decades-old U.S. objective of a comprehensive nuclear test ban; it would strengthen existing treaties and clarify the language in them that has encouraged Moscow to exploit ambiguities and Washington to make charges of Soviet noncompliance; it would prevent extension of the arms race into outer space and curtail SDI; it would remove nuclear weapons from Europe and encourage a transition to nonprovocative defenses there; it would entail reductions in nuclear and conventional armaments and the elimination of chemical weapons; and it would impose restrictions on the use of Soviet and U.S. forces for military intervention in Third World countries.

Not all these goals are self-evidently desirable; disagreements about their priority are inevitable. Yet compelling arguments have been made in favor of each. A comprehensive test ban has long been supported as a first step toward disarmament. It would prevent the development both of low-yield nuclear weapons, which blur the firebreak between conventional and nuclear
forces and could encourage escalation from conventional to nuclear war, and of new "third-generation" weapons such as nuclear-pumped lasers. The arguments against Star Wars are legion; perhaps the most persuasive ones focus on the transition period from an offense-dominated to a defense-dominated world, a period that even Reagan administration officials have admitted could be fraught with uncertainty and danger. Gradual, mutual disarmament could well pose fewer risks, and, unlike Star Wars, it would allow for a much-needed transfer of resources from the military to economic and social development—crucial factors in the security equation. Finally, the most cogent proposals for enhancing security through disarmament have focused on reducing the risks of superpower intervention, conventional war, and nuclear escalation—goals that would be well served by the measures enumerated here.88

Unfortunately, none of these goals seem to be on the official U.S. arms control agenda. They have been excluded by a combination of Reagan administration intransigence and the nature of the arms control debate itself. The only official proposal that aims at increased security through mutual reductions in military strength is the one put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev in January 1986. As former U.S. arms negotiator Raymond Garthoff has pointed out, the Soviet proposal "offers a more straightforward path to a nuclear-free world than President Reagan's plan to accomplish this goal through the deployment of strategic defenses."89 Gorbachev's plan is in many respects "a repackaging of American proposals and American ideas," observed Paul Warnke, former head of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.90 Yet it has not received serious attention in the United States.

Instead, the Reagan administration has cynically manipulated U.S.-Soviet arms negotiations—primarily in order to persuade a sometimes reluctant Congress to continue funding dubious weapons. This is in essence a domestic version of the Reagan administration's successful use of negotiations on missiles in Europe to convince skeptical governments and resistant publics to deploy new Pershing II and cruise missiles there by the end of 1983. More than ever before, arms control talks have become a means to assure that new weapons are deployed.91 Despite the latest Soviet initiatives, the Reagan approach to negotiations has not changed. Discussing one series of Soviet-American talks, for example, U.S. officials expressed "hopes that the fact of talks being held would counter arms control moves in Congress that are opposed by the administration."92 Similarly, President Reagan recently warned Congress that its efforts to reduce
funding for SDI and impose other restrictions on U.S. military programs would harm the chances for an arms control agreement.93

The Reagan White House has so dominated the American debate on arms control that the public is largely unaware of how significant the Soviet concessions have been and how much is at stake in ignoring them. The press has also downplayed Gorbachev's initiatives—essentially adopting the Reagan line. But consider how far Moscow has come. In 1982, then Secretary of State Haig thought the Soviets would never agree to the zero option, perceiving it instead as a U.S. propaganda gesture. Now they have accepted it. As recently as January 1983, one astute observer of Soviet-American arms negotiations argued that the Soviets would not accept deep reductions in their missiles in return for controls on Star Wars research "unless they're stupid": the "Russians won't give up a workable in-place system for a promise to cut back a research-and-development program."94 Yet they have now gone further, offering substantial cuts in their missile forces in return for a U.S. commitment simply to abide by its international treaty obligations and not abandon ABM for 10 or 15 years. Here again, some journalists have distorted the Soviet position by suggesting that the United States would be making a big concession by not breaking a treaty it had signed. One reporter has noted, for instance, that under the present terms of the ABM treaty "either side can withdraw on only six months' notice"; he neglected to mention that this provision applies only if the concerned party "decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests."95 The uncertain prospect of reliable strategic defenses sometime in the distant future does not seem to fit the bill here.

Most journalists, it seems, have rallied around the Reagan position in such a way as to stifle consideration of genuine U.S. security interests. When the administration makes "concessions," such as raising the limit on the numbers of strategic warheads or reversing its decision to try to ban mobile missiles, its actions are described by the media as important signs of flexibility. Yet how would American security be served by an agreement that eases restrictions on Soviet offensive weapons and endorses a new round of competition in defensive weapons?

The debate on what kind of accord would best enhance U.S. security has also been discouraged, ironically, by Soviet "concessions." The merits of SDI, for example, are no longer open to general question. If the Soviets agree merely to postpone Star Wars for a few years, as Reagan proposes, then SDI will become for the 1990s what the Trident D-5 and MX were for the 1980s—weapons mandated by arms control. The most expensive
and controversial military program in the history of humankind has thus become a question of "when" instead of "whether." And so have the administration's other weapons programs. Just a few years ago, the wide-scale deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles, in indistinguishable and unverifiable nuclear and conventional versions, was generally considered inimical to U.S. security. Now that Reagan administration pressure has caused the Soviets to concede to their deployment as part of a potential arms agreement, the weapons are no longer deemed controversial. The same is true for the Midgetman mobile missile. The Midgetman was intended to be able to survive a first strike by Soviet land-based, multiple-warhead missiles (although it was never clear why the new weapons were considered necessary when the United States already has a force of some 5000 virtually invulnerable submarine-based nuclear warheads). The Reagan administration's decision not to limit such mobile weapons as Midgetman in its arms control proposal has reinforced the assumption that they should be built. Few observers, however, seem to have noticed that Soviet disarmament proposals, by entailing deep cuts in land-based missiles, could actually remove the threat that Midgetman is supposed to counter.

It is hard to believe that most analysts have taken the administration's arms proposals seriously. Consider, for example, the Reagan offer not to break the ABM treaty for seven and a half years if the Soviets agree to accept Star Wars thereafter. No honest evaluation of the state of the relevant technology could foresee the deployment of an effective system within that time frame anyway. The Reagan administration offered the Soviets less than nothing, yet some reporters called this "the beginning of a serious bargaining process."96

The really serious bargaining has been taking place between Gorbachev and the U.S. Congress. Fortunately, Congress has begun to act in the administration's stead to pursue such long-standing American arms control goals as a comprehensive nuclear test ban and a ban on antisatellite weapons. When the Soviet Union invited a team of American scientists to set up seismic monitoring equipment on Soviet territory, Congress wisely responded by restraining U.S. nuclear testing and mandating continued compliance with the SALT II and ABM treaties. There is little doubt that these congressional efforts encouraged Gorbachev in turn to extend the Soviet unilateral test moratorium beyond its announced expiration date of August 6, 1986. Many members of Congress would be willing to continue reining in U.S. military programs by tightening the purse strings as long as Moscow showed comparable restraint. The ultimate goal would
be a formal arms control agreement to make such restraints binding and permanent, even if the treaty had to be negotiated by Reagan's successor. For the moment, then, limits on weaponry seem to hinge on a kind of tacit cooperation between Moscow and the U.S. Congress. The Soviets must be willing to maintain their unilateral moratoriums—for example, on testing nuclear warheads and antisatellite weapons, and on deploying SS-20 missiles—and American legislators must be willing to resist administration demands for more tests and more weapons. This situation yields two paradoxical conclusions. First, the Reagan administration's best hope for funding its Star Wars program may lie in securing a Soviet-American arms control agreement that endorses pursuit of strategic defenses. Second, the best hope for arms control may be Moscow's refusal to negotiate such an agreement, coupled with continued Soviet limitation of its military programs and bold congressional action to check comparable U.S. programs. This seems an unusual and perhaps risky approach to arms control. Restraint would depend largely on Gorbachev's good sense, which the administration and consequently the media would portray as intransigence. Congress would make sensible decisions to defeat programs harmful to U.S. security, yet would be derided for undercutting the administration's "bargaining position." All the same, in the face of the unwillingness and inability of the Reagan administration to produce a meaningful arms limitation accord, tacit, mutual restraint remains the most effective barrier to a unconstrained arms race.

Notes

6 Zaiavlenie General'nogo sekretariia TsK KPSS M.S. Gorbacheva, 15 ianvaria 1986 goda (Moscow: Politizdat, 1986). The Soviet Union has published an English translation, State-
ment by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, January 15, 1986 (Moscow: Novosti, 1986).
7 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
8 Ibid.
9 Gorbachev (fn. 3), p. 130.
11 Zaiavlenie M.S. Gorbacheva (fn. 6), p. 5.
12 Akhromeev’s remarks from a Moscow press conference on January 18, 1986 are quoted in the Arms Control Reporter, p. 611.B.287.
13 Arms Control Reporter, p. 611.B.287. It is clear, however, that the Soviets have followed American developments in these areas quite closely. See, for example, V. Dmitriev’s article on fuel-air explosives in Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie [Foreign military review], No. 9 (September 1983), pp. 48-53.
14 Zaiavlenie M.S. Gorbacheva (fn. 6), p. 5.
15 Ibid., p. 6.
17 Ibid., p. 401.B.108.
19 Zaiavlenie M.S. Gorbacheva (fn. 6), pp. 10-11.
20 Arms Control Reporter, pp. 704.B.176-177.
21 Gorbachev (fn. 3), pp. 135-136.
27 Quoted in ibid., pp. 403.B.386-387.
29 Arms Control Reporter, p. 403.B.373.
30 Ibid., pp. 403.B.373, 382.
32 An anonymous West German diplomatic official quoted by Steven Erlanger in the Boston Globe, cited in ibid., p. 704.B.166.
40 Ibid.
42 Nations (fn. 35), p. 31.
44 Gorbachev (fn. 3), p. 119.
45 The text of Brezhnev’s remarks is printed in Pravda, October 28, 1982.
51 For a discussion of how the numbers presented in Soviet proposals relate to presumed Soviet military requirements, see Michael McGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, forthcoming).
53 Ibid., p. 403.B.350.
54 Zaiavlenie M.S. Gorbacheva (fn. 6), p. 7.
55 Transcript of Khruschev’s tape-recorded reminiscences, Harriman Institute Library, Columbia University, pp. 940–941.
57 For discussions, see Philip Noel-Baker, The Arms Race: A Programme for World Dis-

59 Henri Regnard (pseud.), "L'URSS et le renseignement scientifique, technique et technologique," Défense nationale (December 1983), pp. 107-121; and Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western Technology: An Update, a report prepared by the CIA and released by the U.S. Department of Defense in September 1983.

60 For the development of this argument, with historical examples, see Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, forthcoming).

61 Discussion of the "moment of hope" is found in Joel-Nester (fn. 58). For the contemporary analogy, see Charles William Maynes, "Gorbachev: A Serious Offset," Los Angeles Times, January 19, 1986.


64 Arms Control Reporter, p. 403.B.394.


66 Paul Brown of Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, quoted in the Arms Control Reporter, p. 608.B.99.

67 Akhromeev, "Dogovor po PRO" (fn. 23), p. 4.

68 Printed in the Washington Post, March 2, 1986. I am grateful to Jonathan Haslam for calling it to my attention.

69 "Vstrecha M.S. Gorbacheva s predstavitelami mezhdunarodnogo foruma uchenykh za prekrasnichnii iadernykh ispytani" [Meeting of M.S. Gorbachev with representatives of an international forum of scientists for the cessation of nuclear tests], Pravda, July 15, 1986.

70 "Otvety M.S. Gorbacheva na voprosy glavnogo redaktora gazety 'Rude pravo' tovarishcha Zdeneka Gorzheni" [Answers of M.S. Gorbachev to questions of the main editor of the newspaper Rude pravo, comrade Zdenek Hoyteni], Krasnaia zvezda [Red Star], September 9, 1986. It appeared in other Soviet newspapers as well.


74 For a review of recent statements, see Patrick Litherland, "Nuclear Arms: A One-Horse Race?" in Detente, No. 6 (Spring 1986), pp. 7-9.


77 Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Bystre perestavaniias'ia, deistovovat' ponovomu [To change one's views (or adapt) quickly, to act in a new way] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1986), esp. pp. 43-45.


The New Soviet Approach to Security

This argument is associated primarily with Jerry F. Hough; the quotation is taken from his "Soviet Interpretation and Response," in Arms Control and the Strategic Defense Initiative: Three Perspectives, Occasional Paper 36 of the Stanley Foundation (October 1985), p. 11.


Gorbachev (fn. 3), pp. 134–135.


Quoted in Nuclear Times (May-June 1986), p. 32.

90 This argument is associated primarily with Jerry F. Hough; the quotation is taken from his "Soviet Interpretation and Response," in Arms Control and the Strategic Defense Initiative: Three Perspectives, Occasional Paper 36 of the Stanley Foundation (October 1985), p. 11.

91 Talbott (fn. 62).


