Government 316, Fall 2004
http://falcon.arts.cornell.edu/Govt/courses/F04/316.html
Elizabeth
Sanders (instructor)
Office
hours: 314 White Hall, MF 12:15-2 (often later; sign up on
door)
phone:
255-2305
email:
mes14@cornell.edu
Matthew
DiCarlo (teaching asst)
Office
hours: 314 White Hall , W 3:30-4:30 phone:
255-2305
email:
mrd24@cornell.edu
What to Note in the Readings Pre-Midterm
Articles on Campaign Finance:
Bush_fund_raising(pt_1)
Bush_Fund_Raising_graphic
Foreign Policy and Politics:
Policy Met Politics in Cuba Rules
Report on Torture of Prisoners at Abu Ghraib
PIPA on Public Opinion re Abu Ghraib
Osama bin Laden and US Foreign Policy
US Defense Spending 1945-2005 (chart)
Public Opinion and Partisanship
Presidential Preferences of Other CountriesPop Culture and the 2004 Election
State and National Election Survey Data
PIPA_IraqPubOpin.pdf
PSQ_on_Iraq_info.pdf
2004 Election Results: Five NYT Articles
How Bush Won, and His Agenda
Ideology: The Pros and Cons of Neoconservatism
Irving Kristol on NeoconservatismSpheres of influence: Neoconservative think tanks, periodicals, and key documents
Public Policy
Federal Government Spending, Revenues, Employment, and Debt
Rankings of Presidents: Wall St. Journal/Federalist Society (or go to http://www.opinionjournal.com/hail/rankings.html)
Funny Atom film: "This Land is Your Land" (presidential campaign spoof)
Read this before starting your essay:
If you think you or someone you know might be depressed
Things to Note in the Readings for Weeks 1-6. 4 Fall, 2004
Note that while points on the Langston chapter are included below, neither this reading NOR pages 293-317 from Pika and Maltese will be covered on the midterm exam. They will be incorporated in our post-midterm discussions.
1. Grover 1-61. Never mind the particular scholars' names, how have political scientists changed their views of the presidency from the 1930s to the present? What experiences spurred changes in their assessments? What mistakes were made in the uncritical assessments of the "expansionists"? What is lacking in both of the conventional approaches, according to Grover? How is his own "structural" approach to understanding and evaluating presidential power different from the more "shallow" foci of conventional political science? To what phenomena/ linkages does it draw our attention? What is the meaning and significance of "capital strike"? How does Grover's critique of presidential power differ from that of the "restrictivists" (what does he fault them for NOT examining)?2. Pika and Maltese, 1-26, 433-39: Know the difference between enumerated, implied, and inherent powers. What debates about the nature and scope of presidential power took place at the Constitutional Convention and ratification debates in 1787-89? How did the wording supplied by the committee on style, and other ambiguities in Article II create a reservoir of presidential power? Know the traditional list of presidential roles ("chief administrator" etc) and the specific Article II powers on which they are based. How and why did presidential power expand after the 18th century (and especially in the 20th)? Why are Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson considered the first "modern" presidents? Know the significance of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 and the Executive Organization Act of 1939 for presidential power?
3. Pika and Maltese, 128-67 ("Presidential character and Performance"): You might have a rough idea of historians' rankings of presidents (at least those on the top and bottom), referring to table 4-1 or the one at our web site. It is interesting to reflect and speculate on the possible impact of socioeconomic status and educational background on presidential performance, but with so few cases, and so many variables, it is nearly impossible to generalize about these effects. More systematically studied are the personality types posited by well known psychologists, and we have enough histories and biographies of presidents to provide data for testing such theories-though this remains a very controversial approach to the study of the presidency, and many scholars are very skeptical of the best known psychological theory of the presidency, that of James David Barber. His theory is the most important part of this chapter, and you should be familiar with his four-fold typology. What is the theory of personality (character) development on which Barber's theory is based? (Recall lecture on Horney). According to Barber, what are the 3 components of personality and when are they acquired? How can we spot the four types? What does personality type predict (according to Barber)? Which cells should be avoided. in this theory? Which is best? Why? What are the problems with typing and predicting? Since a given personality is not a guarantee of success. and some inhabitants of "bad" cells have been dubbed "great" by historians, what does that tell us? List two or three names in each cell; know the famous "active negatives" and be able to type the last five presidents. It is, of course, tempting to speculate about where the four most recent presidents fit. The studies by Renshon and Greenstein provide recent qualifications to Barber's personality theory. Such work remains intriguing because it seems plausible that basic personality predispositions influence presidential behavior; and unlike prime ministers, independently elected presidents like the American executive have plenty of resources and discretion to give rein to their personal preferences and passions, especially in (but not limited to) areas like foreign policy. The next section of this chapter, on management style, should be considered in combination with the week five ckass discussion of how presidents manage the executive branch, the significance of the EOP units, and the different managerial styles that have marked Republican and Democratic administrations. Consider the contrasts between President George W. Bush and his predecessor Bill Clinton, and how well each accomplished the "systematic review of options" and information that is essential to good decision making. (Of course, this book went to press before the most serious problems of Iraq war planning were revealed). " What personal qualities contribute to a successful presidency?" remains a BIG question, and the public has not reached a consensus.
4. Pika and Maltese 30-76,85-118 ("Election Politics," and section of "Public Politics"): How has the role of the national party nominating conventions changed since the mid-20th century? How have methods of choosing the DELEGATES who attend those conventions every four years changed, and with what effect on the type of delegates who nominate our presidential candidates? What is the significance of the New Hampshire primaries and the Iowa caucuses? How are contests for the nomination financed? (Here know how one qualifies for public matching funds, and why one might choose to forego these public funds). Know the purposes and key provisions of the 2002 BRCA (and the limits on individual contributions in the packet page on Federal law). Considering what one has to do today to win one's party nomination for president, how have the personal qualities and skills of the candidates, and the groups to whom they must appeal changed since the "old days" of party control? What might account for the "unprecedented negativity" of the Bush campaign described in the packet article? Is this just very smart, very well organized campaigning ?
How does the electoral college work, and why does it sometimes "misfire" and give us a president who did not win the popular vote? How does it affect the way candidates campaign? Why don't we get rid of this odd 18th century mechanism, and just use direct election? Look at the table on pp 60-61 and note the voting differences of key groups in the electorate. How do the presidential debates affect the outcome (or do they)? What % of the electorate actually turn out? Before leaving this subject, review your lecture notes on delegate selection and campaign finance, which aren't covered in as much detail in this text.
Pika and Maltese, 85-118: Polling , travel, public speaking, and cultivation of the media (along with attendance at fund-raisers) are major tools of the plebiscitary presidency; note the ways they are used it to build personal electoral coalitions as well as help their parties in Congress, and reflect on the patterns in table 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3. What is unique about President Clinton's public approval ratings? What is the "decay curve"? How is public approval of the president affected by events? [Note President Bush's activities to build support for the Iraq war and achieve the unusual congressional gains of 2002; and note Page 97, which calls up the recent visit of the Iraqi Prime Minister and the way the visit was used]. Reflect on how television and the president's resources for rewarding, punishing, and providing words and images for the media affect the quality of public information…and the power of the president
to persuade.5. P&M 214-48(Executive Politics): In the section on Homeland Security (HS), the only things to note are its size and how it came about. Following Sanders's Postulate [that presidents only attempt to restructure the executive branch when it augments their personal control of useful resources], the president first wanted to bring this important new policy concerns under his personal control by making HS an office in the WHO under a director responsible only to the president, who would not have to be confirmed by the Senate ; a large cabinet department headed by an appointee subject to Senate confirmation (and likely to be sensitive to the concerns of the employees and clientele groups of the dept, as well as the congressional oversight committees) was far less desirable, but this was Congress's preference (even in a Republican Congress. However, once he saw it was inevitable, he fought long and hard (more evidence that Bush is not a "passive" president in Barber's scheme) to have the new employees of the dept subject to his political removal, rather than being protected from political firing by civil service rules. Know how the ex branch is structured (EOP units, plus cabinet depts. and independent agencies of two types-with differential degrees of presidential control. Know the approximate number of civilian and military employees in the ex branch, and the number of major political (policy) appointments. Know the most important provisions of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (pp 225-26) and how it augmented presidential power over the bureaucracy under him. Note that what P&M say about the largely incremental changes in the budget (222) have NOT been true since 9-11, with the large defense and HS spending increases. Using lecture notes in addition to this chapter, note the methods by which the president exerts control of the bureaucracy, yokes its personnel behind his goals. Be able to give examples, and note the particular difficulties presented for the president by divided government and preemptive presidents (Nixon, Clinton examples). One might expect presidents to meet often with their 15 cabinet heads…do they? Be able to name the four "inner" Cabinet heads, and the newest one. What has been the experience of Clinton and Bush in getting their appointees confirmed in the Senate? How do presidents use executive orders? (On what must these orders be based?) Note the particular importance of the OMB to the president. How have Democratic and Republican presidents differed in their administrative styles? [here you may want to read also pages 309-13]. What president undertook a major effort to privatize (outsource) government jobs? (Another example of the often surprising behavior of preemptive presidents). In this chapter, keep in mind the big questions and patterns (e.g., by party, and political time). This is the president's branch, and controlling its huge civilian and military resources is obviously very important to his accomplishments in office, his party program, and his own and his party's re-election. The Constitutional mandate to "faithfully execute the laws" is implemented in the service of his own goals. But Congress and the Courts, the states, and interest groups in the larger society often have reason to challenge his administration in the service of their OWN goals. As messy as that is, democracy would likely not be served well if the president's executive powers were less constrained.
6. P&M 175-206 (Legislative Politics). Read this chapter alert to the tensions between Congress and the president as they struggle to control policy in the service of their different constituencies (especially different under divided government) and their own re-election. What are the president's resources (what can he do?), and weaknesses, in his struggle to get passed the legislation he supports? What factors (know 3-4) help to determine his success? Note that P&M rather underplay the president's ability to use national interest arguments on behalf of their agendas-particularly in foreign policy. [Note: never catch yourself saying, "the president passed legislation that…" or even "the president introduced legislation…", which would suggest a fundamental misunderstanding of the US law making process]. What is the term for the president's claim to withhold information or testimony from Congress (as in the case of the Cheney energy meetings)? What is the basis of the president's claim to be able to hide information from Congress? What are Congress's options here? What are the pros and cons of divided government? (Include Fiorina's arguments here, and those he cites from David Mayhew). What was Clinton's "triangulation" strategy? (Note how such strategies undermine the presidential link to his party, and the weakening of ties discussed by Milkis). What patterns emerge in the presidential use of vetoes? (that is, when are they most likely?) How do presidents GW Bush and Bill Clinton differ in use of the veto? Why, do you think? Be able to list at least three major legislative achievements of Bush and his predecessor, Clinton. What three elections have violated the pattern of presidential party losses in Congress at midterm? What was going on in these three years? Name three laws or other acts of congress that exhibit its determination in the early 1970s to "reassert its congressional prerogatives" in the aftermath of Vietnam and Nixon's assertions of power at the expense of Congress.
7. P&M 293-317 (not covered on midterm): You can read most of this chapter with some
speed, as a broad brush background to the previous chapter, and an introduction to
the next book on domestic policy by Lammers and Genovese. There is some material
on administrative resources (e.g., the OMB) and styles (such as the JFK-LBJ use of
task forces)on pp 309-14. Note also the increasing use of ostensibly representative
commissions on difficult policy questions. But don't worry about the minutiae of
changing issues and temporary modifications in administrative organization.8. Piffner, 58-87: Read this for historical background, the influence and particular modus
operandi of the Roosevelt Executive Office, and the differences that presidential personality
can make in executive management. Don't worry much about historic detail, but get a sense of how each of the presidents discussed are adapting the EOP to their own political needs and to the needs of the times in which they lead. Note why the chief of staff is important to the president, but often controversial (not, however, in the current administration). Note why James Baker, Reagan's Chief of Staff in the White House Office, was a near-perfect COS, and his successor, Donald Regan, one of the least successful. The COS of GHW Bush (John Sununu) was in the same vein, but the fact that Bush himself was so knowledgeable about policy and intent on getting information kept the situation from being disastrous. The material here on styles of administration-e.g., the difference between a Kennedy and an Eisenhower, and apparent party patterns ("controlled chaos," "circus" and "collegial" are not adjectives we apply to GOP administrations)-supplements the P&M reading. Note the tensions between the goals of getting/keeping control of the bureaucracy in order to implement your personal and party goals, and having enough information and lively policy debate to make good decisions.9. PP&M 257-86 (Judicial Politics): Why did critics charge that Bush v. Gore was a
partisan or ideological decision? What were the most contentious issues that divided
justices? Apart from this unprecedented set of circumstances, how are judicial
appointments important to the president's political/programmatic success? What criteria do presidents use in making their (hundreds of ) federal court appointments? Why are appointments to the circuit courts of appeal particularly important? How did the old practice of senatorial courtesy and relatively routine judicial confirmations change in the Clinton and GWB administrations as party polarization hardened? Roughly what percentage of judicial appointments typically come from the president's own party? How did Reagan and Carter compare on this selection criterion? What might this say about ideological intensity in different "political time" cells? Note that (page 269) after two terms, a president can hope to appoint over 40 % of the federal judiciary. How might this augment presidential power? Note the different degrees of diversity in the appointments in table 7-1, and how this mirrors party coalitions. In terms of ideology, (and ideological intensity) how did Clinton's appointees compare with those of Reagan (and Bush jr)? About what percentage of Supreme Court nominations fail? What conditions make failure more likely? How is the Solicitor General important to the president? How successful do the Sgs tend to be when arguing before the Supreme Court? What does this indicate about the relationship between presidents and justices on the SC? Generally, has the SC been supportive of presidential power? Does its support seem to vary by type of (political time) administration or partisanship? Give some examples of cases in which the SC overturned a presidential action.10. Skowronek, "Presidential Leadership in Political Time" (packet-and table/discussion from lecture). Skowronek takes us in a very different direction from Barber and the psychological theories. What is the point of the three pairs of stories in the article? (note that he leaves out one pair-the preemptive president-in this article, but we discuss it in class. What common problems did the three pairs face? What IS "political time"? What is a "regime"? What is the expectation for presidents in each of the four cells? (Consider what role might remain for personality and leadership skills). What central problems do presidents within each of the cells face? Name at least two presidents in each cell. How well do Clinton and Bush fit theirs? Note that Skowronek's is the leading theory of presidential performance/opportunity, so it's important to understand his typology and its bases. We will refer to it often.
11. Lowi , The Personal President , 103-33(in packet): What does Lowi mean by "personal" or "plebiscitary" presidency (PP)? How did the reforms of the 1970s support this development? (Note that this book was written in the early '80s, before the rise of "soft" money, and also before the revival of party organizations and partisanship, particularly in Congress). What are the tools/resources of the PP? Why the inflated campaign rhetoric? What are the disadvantages of the PP for American democracy?
12. Milkis, "The Presidency and Political Parties" in Nelson, ed. (Packet): Since 1932, which presidents have emphasized creative and centralized administrative actions over party leadership? Which have been more strongly partisan? Is there any easy explanation for the differences (for example, consider Showronek's typology)? Why are the two strategies (party leadership and administrative leadership) seen as antithetical (both provide ways for the president to…)? What is the significance of the 1939 Executive Reorganization Act? Of CREEP in 1972? What were the manifestations of party revival in the Reagan-Bush (sr.) era? What was the nature of the Clinton-Democratic Party relationship in 1993-94? In the 1996 campaign? How would you describe the president-party relationship so far under G.W. Bush? Is there something about preemptive presidencies, divided government, or narrowly-elected presidencies that inevitably strain president-party relationships?
13. Jacobson, "Party Polarization…"in Polarized Politics (packet). What evidence does Jacobson present on the growth of partisan ideological polarization in the electorate and Congress over the past two decades? How do the two differ? How do these trends help to explain the GOP impeachment crusade against Clinton in 1998-99, the difficulties of presidential leadership in divided government, and the REASONS that divided government occurs? What changes in the South permitted this polarization? On what sorts of issues is the polarization sharpest? Note how party platforms/issue positions themselves provide potent ideological cues to the electorate and encourage polarization. And note that the ideologically-intense activists Jacobson talks about are the very people most likely to participate in party primaries (and sometimes caucuses), and thus to choose our nominees for the presidency.
14. Langston, Ideologues and Presidents (packet) [Covered on FINAL, but not on midterm]. What is his definition of "ideologue" (How do you know them when you see them? How do they differ from partisans and technocrats?) Which presidential administrations have been the most ideological (and how did they differ from each other?) Does Langston's distinction between ideologues and partisans and assumptions about the decline of party hold up today (Would Newt Gingrich recognize the distinction?) Why does he consider ideologues dangerous?
15. Fiorina, Divided Government. [Elsewhere in the book, Fiorina developed a theory of how divided government emerges out of 1. Local career ambition patterns/degree of state legislative professionalization; and 2. centrist voters' desire to balance party control ]. He shows the much greater incidence of DG in the recent (1952-92) period compared to the 1900-52 period and debunks competing theories about the causes of DG. The most important things to note in this Fiorina reading are the characteristics of ticket splitters, and what are they trying to accomplish by choosing DG. Reflect on the probable benefits or costs of divided (as opposed to unified) government at the national level. Connecting other readings and lecture, be aware of the effects of DG on the Clinton administration (e.g., extreme difficulties in getting his favored legislation passed, congressional scrutiny of his appointments and private behavior, investigations of executive branch agencies, impeachment, etc. after 1994). If Bush is re-elected with a Democratic Senate and/or House, he could face similar difficulties.
16. Ackerman and Judis, "The first Casualty":This was one of the first attempts to answer "What went wrong?' in the Bush administration decision to go to war as it did in Iraq. There are now many books and articles, and reams of testimony before the 9-11 Commission and congressional committees. Read this account from the point of view of what it takes to make a good, well-informed decision as Chief Executive of a massive executive branch. What, indeed, went wrong, and WHY? Can any of our theories or concepts help us to understand this flawed process?Read the short packet article "Management Style Shows Weakness"which addresses another serious problem for the administration, and see if it offers any clues.
1. ORIGINS
a. Hamiltonian design
b. NY governor model
c. Power in vagueness of Art. II
d. Specific constitutional powers of President
e. Growth through precedent
2. First Modern Presidents: TR, WW (Bully Pulpit vs. Party Leader)
a. Their contributions as "stewardship" presidents (Matt's guest lecture about here)
b. Advent of war and international role brings change, growth of "prerogative" powers3. THEORIES
a. Psychological: James David Barber
b. Regime theory ("political time"): Showronek
c. Class (structural) theory Grover (Just an intro here; more later)4. NOMINATION AND ELECTION
a. Campaign Finance Goals and Goals
1. Spread out donations through limits on giving
2. Transparency (reporting requirements)
3. Public Funding (matching grants in nomination stage, complete public funds to party nominees for general election)
4. Loopholes opened up by Supreme Court and FEC decisions, amendments
a. Independent spending
b. Soft Money
5. McCain-Feingold (BCRA) 2002: provisions re soft $ and independent spendingb. Delegate Selection Process, as Reformed 1972 ff
1. Reasons for reforms
2. Caucuses and primaries, timing
3. Democratic/Republican differences in delegate selection process
4. Problems under this system (e.g., resources and ambition required, ideologically polarized delegates, attached to one candidate or issue, fuels plebiscitary pres'cy,
c. Electoral College: How it works, how it affects campaigning, why we don't abolish it5. PRESIDENT AND PARTY
a. Attractiveness of the party government model, contrasts between US and parliamentary systems
b. The concept of the Plebiscitary Presidency (Lowi), its resources, methods, dangers
c. Why the president needs his party (and vice versa): what they do for each other
d. Paradox: parties more united and ideologically polarized today, but president as strong as ever
e. Milkis and administrative resources: how their expansion allowed president to become more independent of party6. EXECUTIVE BRANCH RESOURCES
a. "Staff" and "Line" (Ex. Office of President vs. Cabinet Depts and ind. agencies)
b. Key units of EOP and what they do (esp. WHO, OMB, NSC)
c. Cabinet Depts (15 with HS) and their relative importance, size, and funding (know the five largest, and DOS/DOD contrasts in size and budget
d. Means of control of executive branch:
1. Appointments (c. 3,000 political appts., including top c.600 "Exec. Schedule" with
Senate Confirmation); plus influence over c. 8000 SES personnel, gained under CSRA of 1978
Limits on appts. to independent commissions and boards; others serve at pleasure of
the president
2. Organization/reorganization (why don't presidents pay more attn.?)
3. Central clearance (through OMB)
4. Executive orders
5. Devolution (to states) and privatization7. PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS
a. Cooperation and competition (Constitutional powers, checks and balances)
b. Fiorina and Divided Government
1. Why DG is increasing
2. Veto bargaining, especially frequent in DG
3. Advantages and disadvantages of DG8. PRESIDENT AND COURTS
a. Why important to presidential power… how aids his goal attainment
b. What presidents look for in making appts.
c. Some variation by political time
d. How and why judiciary tilts toward presidency (with variations by political time)
(We will finish last section, and go over a few cases after the midterm)